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SUMMARY
In this thesis we analyze the procurement process of buyers and supply decisions of
manufacturers. Companies are looking for ways to decrease their procurement costs, which
account for a large percentage of the supply chain costs. We study the effects of demand
aggregation and collaborative procurement on buyers’ profitability. First, we make a high-
level analysis and consider a market with multiple buyers and suppliers where multi-unit
transactions for multiple items take place. The procurement costs are effected by economies
of scale in the suppliers’ production costs and by economies of scope in transportation.
We design buyer strategies that model different collaboration levels and assess the role of
collaboration under varying market conditions. Next, we analyze the procurement process
on a lower level and identify benefits of inter-firm collaboration among buyers who are
potential competitors in the end market. We adopt a game-theoretic approach to explore
the economics of the basic mechanism underlying collaborative procurement, and determine
the conditions that makes it an attractive proposition for the participants.
Besides low procurement costs, important considerations in supplier selection are re-
sponsiveness and the reliability of the suppliers in meeting demand. Hence, manufacturers
face the pressure for quoting short and reliable lead-times. We cover several aspects of the
manufacturer’s problem, such as quoting reliable due dates based on the current workload
in the system, maximizing profit considering the lateness cost incurred due to late deliver-
ies, and deciding on the level of inventory to increase responsiveness. We employ a model
where demand arrival and manufacturing processes are stochastic, and obtain insights on




In this thesis we consider the collaborative efforts in the procurement process among supply
chain participants and the challenges that are faced by suppliers in fulfilling demand. Pro-
curement costs account for a high percentage of supply chain costs. According to an article
published in Harvard Business Review (Degraeve and Roofhooft 2001), “Purchased prod-
ucts and services account for more than 60% of the average company’s total costs. For steel
companies, it may go up to 75%; it’s 90% in the petrochemical industry... Bringing down
procurement costs can have a dramatic effect on the bottom line–a 5% cut can translate
into a 30% jump in profits”.
In the first part of this thesis, we analyze the potential benefits of collaboration in
reducing procurement costs (Chapters 2 and 3). Collaborative procurement is one of the
initiatives that helps supply chain partners gain more value-added pricing, service, and
technology from their suppliers than could be obtained individually (Hendrick 1997).
In Chapter 2, we determine the conditions under which buyers benefit intra-firm and
inter-firm collaboration, whereas in Chapter 3 we analyze the dynamics behind group pur-
chasing, which is a prevailing practice of inter-firm collaboration.
Intra-firm collaboration takes place among the internal units of an enterprise. In many
large-scale companies, purchasing is done locally by purchasing units of regional branches
that either act independently or have minimal interaction with each other. For example,
prior to March 2003, the divisions in Sun Chemical Corp. had independent purchasing
procedures. As a result, the company could not realize the potential purchasing power
and was not getting the best prices from its suppliers. By enabling collaboration among
purchasing units through a centralized purchasing organization, Sun Chemical Corp. aims
to reduce the company’s total cost of ownership in the supply chain by 10% (Graff 2004).
Until recently, Dial Corp.’s purchasing was also decentralized. It was typical for buyers
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at different Dial plants to buy the same raw material from different suppliers at different
prices. This approach was ineffective in taking advantage of Dial’s volume and corporate-
wide buying power (Reilly 2002). Similarly, until 1997, purchasing at Siemens Medical
Systems was done locally, where buyers at Siemens’ ultrasound, electromedical, computer
tomography, magnetic resonance imaging and angiography divisions independently bought
the components and material that their individual plants needed and rarely communicated
with each other (Carbone 2001).
Inter-firm collaboration occurs when independent companies work together, synchronize
and modify their business practices for mutual benefit. Examples include Covisint (founded
by DaimlerChrysler, Ford, General Motors and Renault-Nissan), and Chemconnect, an
online exchange in the chemical industry that enables collaboration in purchasing and sales
processes.
Motivated by current of intra- and inter-firm collaboration practices, in Chapter 2 we
consider a market where buyers have multiple functional divisions responsible for purchas-
ing. We assess the role of third party intermediaries (or e-markets) in enabling collaboration
among buyers. We address the following research questions: (i) under which market condi-
tions is collaboration most beneficial?, and (ii) how do the benefits differ in intra-firm and
inter-firm collaborations? We analyze and compare the following models: (I) No collabora-
tion: Buyer divisions and suppliers trade through traditional sales channels, via one-to-one
transactions. No information flow or collaboration exists among the functional divisions
of a buyer or among multiple buyers. (II) Internal collaboration: Functional divisions of
a buyer collaborate internally. (III) Full collaboration: A third party intermediary enables
collaboration among different buyers, and allows the participants to achieve benefits from
both economies of scale and scope due to reduced fixed production and transportation costs.
Chapter 2 ignores competition among the buyers in the end market whereas Chapter 3
considers the case where the buyers compete in the same end market. In this setting, we
study under which conditions collaborative procurement benefits the buyers.
Collaborative procurement is practiced often in the health care industry through group
purchasing organizations (GPOs), and has been increasingly used in other industries as well.
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For example, a Texas based GPO, VHA, saved its members $813.5 million on purchases of
medical supplies and services in 2003 (Vha.com). Other industries where joint purchasing
exists include manufacturing (Mfrmall.com, Purchasing Consortia of Manufacturer’s As-
sociation of Central New York), automotive (Covisint.com), plastics (Polysort.com), and
logistics (Transplace.com, Nistevo.com). In the area of logistics, collaborative purchasing
takes the form of shippers sharing lanes. For example, the collaborative logistics network,
Nistevo, helps buyers to consolidate shipments and share the fleet capacity or arrange
backhauls. General Mills is saving approximately $800, 000 per year by collaborating with
another company on a single tour (Lynch 2000). Transplace has a fuel program that allows
member carriers to procure fuel at lower prices at designated fuel stops across the country.
In these industries, although the buyers are collaborative partners in purchasing, they could
be competing for the same customer base.
The extent of savings may lead potential members of group purchasing programs to
question whether it is actually worth joining such a program. The supplier also has parallel
concerns: does the potential increase in sales volumes justify offering lower prices? We
address the following research questions: (i) what factors are important for group purchasing
to be successful?, (ii) is group purchasing always profitable for the buyers and the supplier?,
and if not, under what conditions is it profitable for the participants? We adopt a game-
theoretic approach to explore the economics of group purchasing, and identify the conditions
that makes it an attractive proposition for the participants.
In a recent survey conducted among 500 manufacturers, 83% of the respondents ranked
the ability to meet delivery schedules as the most important criterion for selecting a vendor
(Keeping 2002). After studying the buyers’ collaborative efforts to lower the procurement
costs, in the second part of the thesis we consider the supplier’s problem of reliability and
responsiveness in meeting demand (Chapter 4). Suppliers are increasingly aware that being
responsive in fulfilling demand while keeping delivery time promises is an important means
by which to differentiate themselves from their competitors.
As a guarantee for meeting delivery promises, firms are offering all or part of the revenue
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back to the customer should a late delivery occur. For example, in September 2003, less-
than-truckload carriers FedEx Freight, Con-Way and USF announced their new service
guarantee where the shipper is not charged if the shipment is not on-time (Boyce 2003).
Real World, a distributor of products such as CPUs, memory chips, and semiconductors,
offers a 5% rebate for late deliveries (Cohodas 1999). During the 2000 Christmas season,
online retailer Roxy.com gave $100 compensation to customers for which it failed to deliver
the orders on-time to (Sandlund 2000).
In the examples cited above, when there is a late delivery the supplier incurs a cost,
which is independent of the duration of the delay. Some companies, however, set a penalty
proportional to the length of the delay. Carload services of CSXT and Union Pacific railroad,
for example, both guarantee delivery with a lateness penalty of $200 per day (Blanchard
2001). This type of penalty is usually a part of the purchase contract in manufacturing and
the amount of the penalty may change with respect to the buyer’s production schedule. For
example, the cost of a late delivery in FMC Wellhead Equipment Division, a producer of
wellhead drilling and completion equipment, may rise up to $250,000 per day (Blanchard
1998). In the aircraft industry the lateness penalties start from $10,000-15,000 and can go
as high as $1,000,000 per day (George 2001; Slotnick and Sobel 2004). As these figures
imply, late deliveries may have catastrophic consequences. In 1997, Boeing faced more
than $200 million in late-delivery penalties (Holmes and France 2002). Delivery promises
are also watched by government agencies. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) charged
seven major e-tailers more than $1,5 million in total when they failed to comply with their
delivery promises during the 1999 holiday season (Sedlak 2001).
Late deliveries and potential loss of goodwill are important incentives for quoting reliable
due dates. Firms may have the tendency to quote slightly longer lead times as a buffer to
ensure reliability. For example, to keep the percentage of on-time arrivals high, airlines
have been announcing longer scheduled travel times for certain trips. In some cases the
scheduled times have increased by as much as 25% over what they were 10 years ago (Peters
2000). However, a delayed due date may cause customers to switch to other suppliers.
When quoting due dates (or lead times), companies need to consider the sensitivity of
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the demand to lead-times. One possible solution for being responsive while not incurring
lateness penalties is to keep stock available. For example, in a repair facility or after-
sales service department, part availability is crucial for customer satisfaction and loyalty
(Unlocking Hidden Value 2003).
In Chapter 4, we examine several facets of a due date quotation problem, including
quoting reliable due dates based on the current workload in the system, maximizing profit
considering the lateness cost incurred due to late deliveries, and deciding on the level of
inventory. We ask the following research questions: (i) when is it more profitable to operate
in a pure make-to-order environment, and when is it more profitable to keep inventory?,
(ii) how much inventory should be kept?, and (iii) how do utilization levels affect the
profitability? We develop a model where demand arrival and manufacturing processes are
stochastic, and obtain insights on the optimal due date policy and on the optimal inventory
level.
For each of the three topics in the thesis, we present a review of the literature in the
corresponding chapter, and describe how our work contributes to the literature. Conclusions
and future work are discussed in Chapter 5.
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CHAPTER II
IMPROVING SUPPLY CHAIN PERFORMANCE
THROUGH BUYER COLLABORATION
2.1 Introduction
In this chapter we consider a market with multiple buyers and suppliers where multi-unit
transactions for multiple items take place. Buyers have multiple functional divisions where
each buyer division is responsible for the procurement of different items. These functional
divisions may or may not collaborate in the procurement process to pool their purchas-
ing power. We design alternative procurement strategies that model three different levels
of buyer collaboration (see Figure 1). Our objective is to identify the conditions where
collaboration is most beneficial to the buyers by testing those strategies under different
markets.
Figure 1: Three models of collaboration among buyers and buyer divisions
6
2.2 Literature Review
Interactions among participants of a supply chain can be analyzed along several directions.
One line of related research focuses on decentralized versus shared information. When the
information is decentralized, studies are primarily on constructing different mechanisms to
enable coordination in a two-stage setting and to eliminate inefficiencies stemming from
double marginalization. Cachon and Zipkin (1999) and Lee et al. (2000) analyze coordi-
nation mechanisms in the form of rebates or transfer payments. Weng (1995) considers a
system where coordination is established through quantity discounts and franchise fees. Jin
and Wu (2001) study supply chain coordination via transfer payments in the presence of
e-market intermediaries. Also see Cachon (2003) for an analysis of coordinating contracts
under different supply chain settings.
Another line of research focuses on collaboration. Internet and technology have made
information sharing possible at every stage, and this leads to different collaborative efforts
in supply chains. Several examples include vendor managed inventory (VMI), just-in-time
distribution (JITD), and collaborative planning, forecasting and replenishment (CPFR), in
which trading partners such as vendors and retailers collaborate vertically. In VMI systems
the vendor is given autonomy in replenishing the retailer’s orders and in turn manages the
retailer’s inventory with fewer stockouts and at low levels. In the pilot effort on CPRF in
1997, Wal-Mart and vendors Lucent and Sara Lee were sharing event and point of sales
information to jointly forecast sales (http://www.cpfr.org). There is a growing interest in
supply chain literature on analyzing the benefits of VMI in supply chains, for example see
Cetinkaya and Lee (2000) and Cheung and Lee (2002). Relatively little research exists
on collaboration through forecasting. Aviv (2001) studies the benefits of collaborative
forecasting with respect to decentralized forecasting.
Horizontal collaboration differs from vertical in the sense that it considers collaboration
among those only on the buyer or supplier side. Horizontal coordination and collaboration
in the supply chain enabled by quantity discounts is studied by Gurnari (2001) in a single
supplier two buyer setting. Some existing research considers the interaction of buyers and
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suppliers from a resource allocation perspective. Ledyard, Banks and Porter (1989) test al-
location mechanisms with uncertain resources and indivisible demand. The results indicate
that high efficiency could be obtained if collaboration is enabled among buyers. To the best
of our knowledge there has not been much research on the loss of efficiency due to lack of
horizontal collaboration. In this chapter, we study the interaction between multiple buyers
and multiple suppliers, where horizontal collaboration is enabled by a central mechanism
(or intermediary).
A similar problem is studied by Kalagnanam, Davenport and Lee (2000), where the
motivation came from electronic markets in the paper and steel industries. The authors
consider an e-market in which buyers and suppliers submit bid and ask prices for multiple
units of a single product. They show that the problem of determining the clearing price
and quantity under different assignment constraints can be solved in polynomial time when
demand is divisible, but is NP-hard when demand is not divisible.
We extend the work of Kalagnanam, Davenport and Lee (2000) in several directions.
We consider multiple products, rather than a single product, where each supplier needs to
decide how to allocate its limited capacity among these multiple products. Furthermore, we
consider fixed costs of production and transportation which lead to economies of scale and
scope. Finally, in addition to the “centralized” e-market (where all the buyers and suppliers
are available in the market at the same time and the buyer-supplier assignments are done
centrally) we study two other scenarios where buyers arrive to the market sequentially and
select suppliers on a first come first served basis.
2.3 Model
To model buyers’ behavior in the market, we assume that buyers or buyer divisions arrive
with requests for quotes (RFQ) for each item they want to buy. We assume buyers initiate
the trades by submitting RFQs to the suppliers. A buyer requests that her entire demand
for an item is satisfied from a single supplier. Hence, a supplier would respond to a buyer’s
RFQ only if he has enough production capacity to satisfy the buyer’s entire demand for that
item. Such all-or-nothing buyer behavior is observed in several industries for various reasons.
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Splitting an order across multiple suppliers complicates order tracking and transportation
arrangements. In addition, order splitting might also lead to inconsistency in quality. For
example, in the paper industry the quality of the paper produced by different machines is
slightly different, which may create problems in printing. Similarly, in carpet manufacturing,
carpet produced at different times or locations has slight color variations which can be
noticed when the carpet is installed.
Each buyer has a reservation price for each item, which is the maximum price for the
purchase of the set of good (not per unit of the item). A buyer’s surplus for an item is
defined as the buyer’s reservation price for that item minus the final contracting price for
the entire demand of the buyer for that item. With the goal of maximizing her surplus, if
there are no quotes (bids) that are acceptable to a buyer at a given time, she may leave the
market and come back later with the hope of getting a better quote.
By evaluating the quotes offered by the suppliers (if any) buyers decide which supplier
to choose for each item. A supplier might produce multiple types of items and has limited
production capacity to be shared among these items. A supplier’s cost for an item consists
of four components:
• The manufacturing setup cost for that item (fixed production cost). A supplier ini-
tiates production and incurs a setup cost for an item only if a buyer places an order
for that item.
• Variable production cost per unit.
• Fixed cost of transportation.
• Variable transportation cost per unit.
In responding to the buyer RFQs, suppliers use a cost plus pricing scheme, i.e., set prices
to cover the fixed and variable costs and leave enough profit margin for profits. Despite
its limitations, cost-plus pricing is commonly used in various industries. For example, in
the logistics industry, 33% of third-party logistics companies (3PL) in North America used
cost-plus pricing in 2000 (Smyrlis 2000).
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To keep the exposition simple, we ignore the profit margin component and focus only
on the cost component, i.e., the bid price quoted by a supplier is obtained by adding up
the cost components. However, as we will explain in the following sections, what the buyer
pays in the end (contract price) might be lower than what the supplier quotes originally.
We assume that the buyers select suppliers based on price alone. Although price is an
important criterion in supplier selection, most buyers also consider other factors, such as
quality and delivery time reliability, while selecting a supplier. However, we focus on com-
modity procurement, where multiple vendors with similar quality and delivery performance
exist.
In the remainder of this chapter we assume that each buyer division is responsible for
the procurement of one item (hence, the index for items and buyer divisions is the same,
see Table 1). We also assume that the different divisions of the same buyer are located
in the same region, which implies that the locations of the divisions are close enough to
allow for consolidation of orders for transportation and thus for price discounts from the
carriers; e.g., the “region” can be a state, or the south-east region of the United States. The
pricing structure enables buyers to obtain economies of scale and scope. As more buyers
place orders with the same supplier for the same item, the associated fixed production
cost for each buyer decreases (economies of scale). As a single buyer places orders at the
same supplier for multiple items, the associated fixed transportation cost per unit decreases
(economies of scope). This type of cost (or price) structure can also be interpreted as a
volume discount.
The demand quantities of the buyers and initial capacities available at the suppliers
represent the total demand and total supply in the market. Initially there is no production
setup at the suppliers. As buyers accept supplier bids and make contracts for the items,
suppliers initiate production.
2.3.1 No Collaboration
In this market structure, we model traditional marketplaces, where neither the functional
divisions of a buyer nor different buyers in the market collaborate with each other. As
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Table 1: A glossary of notation for Chapter 2
i: index for buyers, i ∈ I
j: index for items (or buyer divisions), j ∈ J
k: index for suppliers, k ∈ K
Kj : set of suppliers that produce item j
Divij : buyer i, division j
dij : demand of buyer i for item j
Dj : total demand in the market for item j,
∑
i dij
D: total demand in the market,
∑
j Dj
qijk: quantity of item j produced at supplier k (upon receiving an RFQ from buyer i)
tjk: total quantity of item j produced at supplier k
resij : reservation price of buyer i for the total demanded quantity of item j
fpcjk: fixed production cost for item j at supplier k
vpcjk : variable production cost per unit for item j at supplier k
ftcik : fixed cost for transportation between buyer i and supplier k
(might also include the fixed transaction costs)
vtcik : variable cost for transportation per unit between buyer i and supplier k
cjk: capacity required to produce one unit of item j at supplier k
tck: total capacity at supplier k
capk: available capacity at supplier k, upon receiving an RFQ
ave(cjk): capacity required to produce one unit of item j averaged out over all suppliers








1pjk: indicator variable equal to 1, if supplier k started production for item j
1tik : indicator variable equal to 1, if buyer i and supplier k have contracted before
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discussed earlier, many firms have uncoordinated purchasing divisions. For example, until
recently Chevron’s procurement structure was fragmented and decentralized where “people
at many different locations were buying many materials, (often the same materials) from
their favorite suppliers, or on an as-needed basis” (Reilly 2001).
We assume that the functional divisions arrive sequentially and independently to the
market. Therefore the marketplace can be thought of as a queue of buyer divisions each
with an RFQ for a specific item. When a buyer division makes a contracting decision, she
is unaware of the other buyer divisions’ demands or procurement decisions (including the
ones both from the same and different companies), or about the current order status at the
suppliers. After submitting an RFQ, a buyer division makes the contracting decision only
based on the unit prices quoted by the suppliers. Once the contracting decision is made
and the purchase order is submitted by a buyer division, another buyer division arrives to
the market and submits an RFQ.
Buyer divisions’ decisions in contracting will depend on the kind of information they
receive from the suppliers. A supplier can provide either a pessimistic or an optimistic
quote to a buyer. When providing a pessimistic quote, the supplier regards that buyer as
if she will be the last one to contract for that item. When providing an optimistic quote
(opt), the supplier assumes that he will supply all the demand in the market for that item.
The optimistic quote is a lower bound on the final contract price, whereas the pessimistic
quote is an upper bound.
Given an RFQ by buyer division j of company i for dij units of item j, the supplier








The first two terms in equation (1) correspond to the unit production cost, Pk(dij). The
fixed production cost for an item is shared among multiple buyer divisions (from different
companies) who placed orders for that item with the supplier. qijk is the total quantity for
item j already contracted at supplier k upon receiving the RFQ of company i division j.
The last two terms of equation (1) correspond to the unit transportation cost, Tk(dij).
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The fixed transportation cost is shared among multiple buyer divisions from the same
company who placed orders (for different items) with the same supplier. The set S contains
the current buyer division and the other buyer divisions of the same company that have
already contracted with supplier k.
Note that if a buyer division is the first one to place an order for an item at a supplier,
then she is quoted all the fpc. Similarly, when a supplier receives an RFQ for the first time
from a buyer division of a particular company, he incorporates all the ftc in the bid.
To compute the optimistic quote, supplier k needs to first compute (an upper bound
on) the maximum total quantity of orders for item j he could produce upon receiving an
RFQ, which is:




The maximum total quantity is bounded by the minimum of two terms. The first is
the total demand for item j in the market. The second is the quantity of item j already
produced by supplier k plus the maximum additional quantity of item j that can be produced
by supplier k.










Upon receiving an RFQ, supplier k computes the following optimistic quote for buyer i per







+ vpcjk + vtcik (2)
In the remainder of the chapter, we assume that the supplier provides a pessimistic
quote is provided by the supplier unless otherwise stated.








+ vpcjk + vtcik, (3)
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where tjk is the total quantity of item j produced at supplier k in the final matching. The
contract price of an item has a similar structure to the bid price for that item. In the
contract price, the fpc portion to be paid by each contracting buyer is calculated as fpcjktjk .
Hence, as the number of buyers contracting with a supplier for the same item increases, the
unit price to be paid by a buyer decreases. Therefore, in the end the price paid by a buyer
might be lower than the quoted price.
The practice of lower final prices paid by the buyers compared to the initial bids offered
by the suppliers is commonly observed in group purchasing programs. For example, the
price of a product goes down as more buyers join the group and agree to buy that product at
the current posted price. Although some buyers may have joined the group (and committed
to purchasing) while the price was higher, in the end all the buyers pay the final, lowest
price.
In the final matching, the surplus of buyer i contracted with supplier k for item j is:
surplusij = (resij − priceijk · dij) (4)
Note that when considering the supplier bids, the buyer division multiplies the bid price
with the total demand for the item to evaluate her surplus.
Buyer Strategies
A buyer division submits RFQs to the suppliers for the item she demands and chooses
a supplier with the goal of maximizing her surplus for the item she demands. We consider
the following buyer strategies for accepting or rejecting a bid.
1. If some of the supplier bids are lower than her reservation price, she accepts the
minimum bid.
2. If all the bids are higher than the buyer division’s reservation price, she accepts the
minimum offer with probability α.
3. If the buyer division rejects all the quotes (with probability 1-α), then with probability
β, she leaves the market permanently. With probability 1−β she returns to the market
(i.e., joins the end of the queue) since there is a possibility that the minimum bid the
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buyer receives later is lower than the current minimum bid. The buyer stays in the
market until her surplus becomes positive or the bid prices stop decreasing, whichever
happens first.
Having defined a general scheme, we now describe alternative buyer strategies. A buyer
division makes a contract with the supplier that offers the minimum bid, if that bid is below
her reservation price. Otherwise, the buyer division:
Myopic Strategy, myopic (α = 0, β = 1) Leaves the market.
Accept the minimum bid, min (α = 1, β = 0) Makes a contract with the supplier
that offers the minimum bid.
Leave and possibly return later, loq (α = 0, 0 < β < 1) Leaves the market with
probability 0 < β < 1, returns to the market and joins the queue with probability 1− β.
Leave and return later, q (α = 0, β = 0) Returns to the market and joins the end
of the queue.
Accept the lowest bid or leave and return later, aoq (0 < α < 1, β = 0) Accepts
the minimum bid with probability α. With probability 1-α she rejects all the bids and joins
the end of the queue.
Minimum optimistic bid, mob Accepts the minimum optimistic bid, mink{optijk}.
Example 1. Consider a marketplace where there are four buyer divisions, Divij , i =
1, 2, j = 1, 2 (two companies with two divisions each), three suppliers, Sk, k = 1, . . . , 3 and
two items, I1 and I2. A buyer division j is responsible for item Ij , j = 1, 2. The buyer
divisions arrive to the market in the following order: (1) company 1 division 1, (2) company
2 division 1, (3) company 1 division 2, (4) company 2 division 2. Buyer divisions use the
accept the minimum bid strategy for contracting decisions. For simplicity we assume that
the suppliers are uncapacitated. The information regarding buyer divisions (Div), suppliers
(S) and items (I) is listed in the tables below.
Company 1 division 1 places an RFQ for item 1. The quoted bids for per unit of item
1 by supplier 1, supplier 2 and supplier 3 are 18.75, 131.37 and 19 respectively (refer to
equation 1). Supplier 1 wins the contract for item 1.
Next, company 2 division 1 arrives to the market and submits an RFQ for item 1.
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Table 2: Demand and reservation prices
Div11 Div12 Div21 Div22
Demand for I1 40 - 10 -
Demand for I2 - 25 - 75
Res. price for I1 2000 - 500 -
Res. price for I2 - 3750 - 7500
Supplier 1 has already initiated production for item 1. Therefore supplier 1 reflects only
some portion of the fixed production cost in the quote, whereas supplier 2 and supplier
3 reflect all the fixed production cost in their quotes. The quotes per unit of item 1 by
suppliers 1, 2 and 3 are 24, 486 and 30 respectively. Company 2 division 1 contracts with
supplier 1 for item 1.
Table 3: Fixed and variable production costs
S1 S2 S3
I1 fpc11 = 100 fpc12 = 140 fpc13 = 100
vpc11 = 10 vpc12 = 10 vpc13 = 10
I2 fpc21 = 9125 fpc22 = 100 fpc23 = 4605
vpc21 = 10 vpc22 = 10 vpc23 = 10
Table 4: Fixed and variable transportation costs
S1 S2 S3
B1 ftc11 = 50 ftc12 = 4515 ftc13 = 60
vtc11 = 5 vtc12 = 5 vtc13 = 5
B2 ftc21 = 50 ftc22 = 4570 ftc23 = 50
vtc21 = 7 vtc22 = 5 vtc23 = 5
Next, company 1 division 2 places an RFQ for item 2. While quoting the bids, supplier 1
incorporates only some portion of the fixed transportation cost, since supplier 1 has already
contracted with division 1 of the same company for item 1. The bids quoted by suppliers 1,
2 and 3 are 380.77, 199.60, 201.60, respectively. For item 2, company 1 division 2 contracts
with supplier 2 and is charged for two different fixed transportation costs by both supplier 1
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and supplier 2. The surplus she obtains for item 2 is res12−bid122 ·d12 = 3750−199.60·25 =
−1240. Although the surplus value is negative, since the strategy under consideration is
accept the minimum bid, this does not impose any restriction on contracting.
Finally company 2, division 2 submits an RFQ for item 2. Supplier 2 has initiated
production for item 2. The quotes for item 2 by suppliers 1, 2 and 3 are 139.25, 76.93,
77.07, respectively. For item 2, company 2 division 2 contracts with supplier 2. She is also
charged for two different fixed transportation costs. Bid prices and contracted suppliers are
shown in Table 5.
Table 5: Bid prices under no collaboration
S1 S2 S3
Div11 bid111 = 18.75 bid112 = 131.75 bid113 = 19
Div12 bid121 = 380.77 bid122 = 199.60 bid123 = 201.60
Div21 bid211 = 24 bid212 = 486 bid213 = 30
Div22 bid221 = 139.25 bid222 = 76.93 bid223 = 77.07
The contract prices paid by the buyers are shown in Table 6 and the total surplus is
2115. The matchings for the no collaboration example are shown in Figure 2(a). In the
following sections we analyze the same example under different collaboration models.




40+10 + 10 +
50
40 + 5 = 18.25 2000− 18.25 · 40 = 1270 105
Div12
100
25+75 + 10 +
4515
25 + 5 = 196.6 3750− 196.6 · 25 = −1165
Div21
100
10+40 + 10 +
50
10 + 5 = 22 500− 22 · 10 = 280 2010
Div22
100
25+75 + 10 +
4570
75 + 5 = 76.93 7500− 76.93 · 75 = 1730
2.3.2 Internal Collaboration
Advances in information technology and enterprise systems have increased the availability
of real-time data. This, in turn, has led to increased levels of information sharing and
collaboration among the divisions (or business units) of a company. Before 1997, each
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division of Siemens Medical Systems had its own supplier and this significantly deteriorated
buying power. Centralization of purchasing has saved 25% on material costs (Carbone
2001). Similarly, Chevron Corp. is aiming to cut 5% to 15% from annual expenditures by
centralizing the procurement system and by leveraging volume buys (Reilly 2001).
In this section we assume that the procurement function is centralized within each
company. Equivalently, multiple divisions within a company collaborate for procurement.
We also assume that buyers know the structure of the transportation cost (ftc and vtc)
for each supplier, possibly specified with a long-term contract. Examples of such practices
are commonly found in the procurement of transportation services, such as trucking or sea
cargo. Shippers contract with multiple carriers where each contract specifies a volume-based
price and capacity availability. However, the buyers usually do not have to commit to a
shipment volume in these contracts; even if they do, such minimum volume commitments
are typically not enforced by the carriers. In our model, the price structure is defined by
fixed and variable costs, i.e., suppliers offer volume discounts. We assume that a company
i can request and receive information about the available total capacity, capk, and the
volume-based price quote Pk(dij) (first two terms of equation (1)) for any item j from a
supplier k for her entire demand dij . This implies that a company can determine the total
cost for an order using the information on the transportation cost component and the quote
on the production cost component for any item-supplier combination.
Under internal collaboration each company decides how much of each product to procure
from each supplier using a centralized mechanism. The procurement decision of a company,
say buyer i, can be modelled by the following linear integer program.
xijk: 1, if buyer i contracts with supplier k for item j.











(Pk(dij) + vtcik) · dij · xijk −
∑
k





cjk · dij · xijk ≤ capk ∀k (6)
(IP-I) xijk ≤ yik ∀j, k (7)∑
k
xijk = 1 ∀j (8)
Constraint (6) ensures that the amount of demand satisfied by a supplier does not exceed
the current available capacity of the supplier. Constraint (7) ensures that when a contract
is made with a supplier the corresponding fixed transportation cost is charged to the buyer.
Constraint (8) ensures that the buyer contracts with a single supplier per item.
The buyers contract with the suppliers sequentially as in the no collaboration model.
The model does not include any reservation price constraint. This implies that if the buyer
surplus is negative after solving the IP-I, the buyer still makes the contract. Each buyer
makes the contracting decision based on maximizing her current surplus in equation (5).
In the final matching, the contract price and surplus of buyer i for item j is obtained as in
equations (3) and (4).
Example 1. (cont.) We analyze our previous example assuming that each company
makes its procurement decisions centrally. Buyer 1 (both divisions of company 1) arrives
to the market and makes the contracting decisions for both items by solving the IP model
above. Based on the outcome of the model, buyer 1 contracts with supplier 2 for both items
and is charged the fixed transportation cost only once.
When buyer 1 makes her contract, supplier 2 initiates production for both items. There-
fore, if buyer 2 also contracts with supplier 2, the associated fixed production cost for both
items will be shared among the two buyers. Buyer 2 solves the same model with updated
P2(d21) and P2(d22) values. The solution suggests that buyer 2 also contracts with supplier
2 for both items. Therefore the buyers benefit from both economies of scale and scope.
For buyer 1 the final contract price per unit of item 1 is 87.26 and the final price per
unit of item 2 is 85.46. Therefore the total surplus of buyer 1 is 123. For buyer 2, the
contract prices per unit of item 1 and 2 are, 71.57 and 69.76. The total surplus of buyer
2 is 2052. As compared to the traditional market, both buyers have increased their total
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surplus. The overall buyer surplus obtained in the market is 2175.
Table 7: Contract prices and surplus under internal collaboration
I1 I2 surplusi
B1 price112 = 87.26 price122 = 85.46 (2000− 87.26 · 40)+
(3750− 85.46 · 25) = 123
B2 price212 = 71.57 price222 = 69.76 (500− 71.57 · 10)+
(7500− 69.76 · 75) = 2052
2.3.3 Full Collaboration
In the full collaboration model, we assume that a third party intermediary enables collabora-
tion among multiple buyers. We use the terms e-market and full collaboration interchange-
ably. However, in practice not all e-markets enable full collaboration. Some e-markets
provide only catalog services where suppliers and buyers post supply and demand quanti-
ties. 3PL providers such as Transplace or C.H. Robinson, where shippers and carriers do
not contract directly with each other but through the 3PL intermediary, may enable full
collaboration.
In this model, each buyer submits her demand and reservation price for each item, and
each supplier submits cost and capacity information to the intermediary. The intermediary
in turn matches supply and demand in the market with the objective of maximizing the
total buyer surplus.
The matching problem faced by the intermediary can be modelled by the following linear
integer problem, which is a slight modification of (IP-I):

























(vpcjk +vtcik) ·dij ·xijk
(9)
subject to






cjk · dij · xijk ≤ tck ∀k (10)
xijk ≤ zjk ∀i, j, k (11)
Constraint (10) ensures that the amount of demand satisfied by a supplier does not
exceed the total capacity of the supplier. Constraint (11) ensures that when production is
initiated at a supplier for an item, a fixed production cost is incurred for that item.
In the final matching, the contract price and surplus of buyer i for item j is obtained
as in equations (3) and (4). While matching supply and demand, it is possible that some
buyers have a negative surplus.
Example 1. (cont.) We illustrate the full collaboration model using our previous
example where the intermediary simultaneously matches buyers and suppliers. Under this
model both companies contract with supplier 3 on both items. The contract prices and the
surplus are given in Table 8. The total buyer surplus under this model is 6685.
Table 8: Contract prices and surplus under full collaboration
I1 I2 surplusi
B1 price113 = 17.92 price123 = 61.97 (2000− 17.92 · 40)+
(3750− 61.97 · 25) = 3483.75
B2 price213 = 17.58 price223 = 61.63 (500− 17.58 · 10)+
(7500− 61.63 · 75) = 3201.25
As seen in Figure 2, increasing collaboration levels among buyers leads to different
matchings.
2.4 Experimental Design
In this section we test how the three collaboration models perform under different market
conditions. We consider a market with 25 buyers, 6 suppliers and 3 items. Each buyer
places RFQs for all 3 items and suppliers have the capability to produce any of the items.
We assume that the capacity required to produce one unit of any item is 1.
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Figure 2: Matchings under different models of buyer collaboration
Table 9: Surplus obtained by each buyer under different collaboration levels
B1 B2 Total
no collaboration 105 2010 2115
internal collaboration 123 2052 2175
full collaboration 3483.75 3201.25 6685
The parameters that define the marketplace are listed in Table 10. We selected the
following three factors for controlling the market structure.
1. market supply (total capacity).
2. manufacturing set-up cost (fpc) versus variable production cost (vpc).
3. fixed transportation cost (ftc) versus variable transportation cost(vtc).
We define two levels (low and high) for each of the three factors and obtain 8 different
market settings.
2.4.1 Design Parameters
Market Supply vs. Market Demand
The demand of each buyer for each item is generated from a uniform distribution U[d,d]
(see Table 10). The market supply is defined as the total production capacity of the market,
which can be either “low” or “high” compared to the expected total demand in the market.
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We model low (high) market supply by setting the supply equal to the lower (upper) bound
of the total demand.
Average total capacity required to satisfy low market demand =
TClow = (# of buyers)·(# of items per buyer)·(d per item)·(avg. capacity required per unit)
Average total capacity required to satisfy high market demand =
TChigh = (# of buyers)·(# of items per buyer)·(d̄ per item)·(avg. capacity required per unit)
In our experiments we assume that the capacities of the suppliers are equal and hence
the capacity per supplier is the total market capacity divided by the number of suppliers.
Fixed Costs of Manufacturing and Transportation
The average setup cost of production, i.e., the mean of fpc, is set at either “low” or
“high” levels as compared to the average variable production cost vpc, where µfpc=50
or 1000 and µvpc=10. fpc values are generated randomly from the uniform distributions
U[46,54] and U[980,1020], for the low and high fpc levels, respectively.
The fixed cost of transportation, ftc, is set either at “low” or “high” levels as compared
to vtc, where µftc=20 or 500 and µvtc=5. ftc values are generated randomly from the
uniform distributions U[18,22] and U[485,515], for the low and high cases, respectively.
Note that rather than the individual values of fpc, ftc, vpc and vtc, we consider the
ratios fpcvpc and
ftc
vtc as the design factors in our experiments.
Reservation Price
We generate the reservation prices of the buyers randomly from the uniform distribution
U ∼ [(vpc + vtc) · d, fpc + ftc + (vpc + vtc) · d]. The lower bound corresponds to the case
where (in the limit) the buyer only pays the variable costs. The upper bound corresponds
to the worst case where a buyer incurs the entire fixed production and transportation cost,
in addition to the variable costs.
The design factors and factor levels are shown in Table 12.
2.4.2 Buyer strategies
In our experiments, we consider the following buyer strategies defined previously:
23
Table 10: The parameters of the market
Demand per item U(10, 20)











Table 11: Upper and lower bound for reservation price in four different market types





Table 12: Design factors and levels
Levels low high
factor 1 Supply/Demand .66 1.33
factor 2 fpc/vpc 5 100
factor 3 ftc/vtc 4 10
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1. No collaboration
(a) Myopic strategy (myopic)
(b) Accept the minimum bid (min)
(c) Leave and possibly return later (loq) with β = DQ
(d) Leave and return later (q)
(e) Accept the lowest bid or leave and return later (aoq) with α = 0.25
(f) Minimum optimistic bid (mob)
2. Internal collaboration (int)
3. Full collaboration (e-market)
2.4.3 Performance Measures
To evaluate the effectiveness of different bidding strategies under various market conditions,
we consider several performance measures. One important measure is the amount of market
liquidity (i.e., the number of participants in the market or the number of trades taking place)
generated by a strategy. The liquidity in the marketplace increases both with the increase
in buyer satisfaction (i.e., the amount of satisfied demand) and with the amount of total
surplus obtained in the market. Buyers also benefit by the quality of the surplus, i.e., the
amount of surplus obtained per item.
One other evaluation criteria is whether a strategy helps to decrease the total setup
effort in the market, which can be measured by the total cost incurred. However, since a
low total cost may imply a low satisfied demand, we also consider the cost per unit.
As a result we defined four performance measures:
1. % of satisfied demand = quantity of satisfied demandtotal market demand · 100
2. total surplus = total reservation price - total cost
3. average surplus per unit= total surplusquantity of satisfied demand
4. average cost per unit= total costquantity of satisfied demand
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Current e-marketplaces focus on different performance measures. For example, Transplace
uses the capacity of several carriers to satisfy demand, which makes it an attractive choice
for shippers in terms of demand satisfaction. Similarly, consortia e-marketplaces such as
Covisint.com help buyers to achieve economies of scale and therefore reduce average cost
per unit. It is important to note that when comparing different bidding strategies, the most
appropriate one does not necessarily need to perform well across all measures, since buyers
may have different preferences.
2.5 Experimental Results
In this section we compare the strategies with respect to the performance measures. Each
market consists of 25 buyers 6 suppliers and 3 items. The results are obtained and compared
using a t-test for 8 market types and 8 strategies, with 15 runs for each market type; strategy
combination.
The market types are indicated by a 3 digit code abc, where {a,b,c}∈{0,1}. 0 corresponds
to low level setting for that factor and 1 corresponds to high level. a indicates capacity
level in the market, b indicates fpcvpc level and c indicates
ftc
vtc level. For example, the 101
market corresponds to high capacity, low fixed cost of production and high fixed cost of
transportation.
The results are presented in Tables 13-19. In Tables 14, 16, 18 and 20 a “>” sign indi-
cates that a strategy has resulted in a higher value at the indicated significance level (SL).
If two strategies are in the same set, then their performances are not significantly different
from each other.
2.5.1 Results for % of satisfied demand
Observation 1 When capacity is high
i. aoq, min, mob and int perform best in satisfying the demand, followed by e-market,
followed by q, followed by loq and myopic.
ii. If there are no economies of scale and scope (market 100), then loq and myopic have
similar performance; otherwise, loq outperforms myopic.
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It is not surprising that mob, min and int perform well since they do not consider
reservation prices. Since aoq accepts offers with some probability even if they are above
the reservation price, it also performs well in satisfying the demand.
Observation 2 When capacity is low
i. e-market is at least as good as any other strategy in satisfying the demand.
ii. When benefits from economies of scale or scope are high myopic and loq are always
the worst, followed by q.
iii. min, int, aoq and mob have similar performance when there are economies of scope.
When there are no economies of scope, e-market dominates other strategies.
Note that myopic and loq are always the worst in satisfying the demand except for 000,
followed by q, regardless of the capacity level in the market.
Table 13: Satisfied demand in different markets
Market myopic min q aoq loq mob int e-market
type
000 64.96% 65.03% 64.96% 64.82% 64.96% 64.33% 64.78% 65.49%
001 21.15% 64.52% 27.20% 64.77% 21.15% 64.46% 64.78% 64.91%
010 29.80% 64.93% 35.88% 65.02% 29.80% 63.90% 64.55% 65.41%
011 19.91% 64.53% 26.55% 64.49% 19.91% 64.52% 64.60% 65.06%
100 95.08% 100.00% 97.38% 100.00% 95.53% 100.00% 100.00% 99.37%
101 22.19% 100.00% 35.38% 99.82% 25.02% 100.00% 99.70% 94.70%
110 40.93% 100.00% 57.12% 100.00% 46.65% 100.00% 100.00% 96.33%
111 26.00% 100.00% 42.68% 99.82% 30.19% 100.00% 99.71% 84.67%
2.5.2 Results for total surplus
Observation 3 e-market outperforms all other strategies in terms of total surplus under
any market structure. The benefit of e-market compared to the next best strategy is highest
when the capacity is low and there are economies of scale and scope (Figure 3).
Observation 4 In maximizing the total surplus
i. int outperforms mob when there are economies of scope (markets 001, 011, 101 and 111).
ii. min outperforms int when there are economies of scale but not scope (markets 010 and 110).
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Table 14: Comparison of strategies with respect to the percentage of satisfied demand
Market Performance sl
type
000 e-market > {min, myopic=loq=q, aoq, int, mob} 97%
001 {e-market, int, aoq, min, mob} > q > {myopic = loq} 99%
010 e-market > {aoq, min } > int > mob > q > {myopic=loq} 96%
011 { e-market, int, min, mob, aoq} > q > {myopic=loq} 99%
100 {aoq=min=mob=int} > e-market > q > {loq, myopic} 99%
101 {min=mob, aoq, int}> e-market > q > loq > myopic 99%
110 {aoq=min=mob=int}> e-market > q > loq > myopic 99%
111 {min=mob, aoq, int}> e-market > q > loq > myopic 99%
iii. q outperforms loq when there are either economies of scale or scope or when the capacity is
high. In market 000, q and loq have the same performance.
iv. mob outperforms or does as well as min in all markets. The difference between mob and min
is greatest when the capacity is high and there are only economies of scope (market 101).
v. aoq outperforms loq when there are economies of scale (markets 010, 011, 110, 111); otherwise
loq either outperforms or does as well as aoq.
Observation 4.i is in line with the fact that int tries to consolidate orders of the same
buyer for different products and therefore saves on transportation cost, whereas mob focuses
on lowering the production cost by consolidating orders from different buyers for the same
product.
Observation 4.ii implies that when the benefits from economies of scale are high, the
min strategy leads to fewer production initiations as compared to the int strategy. In the
int strategy, due to collaboration, the buyer divisions arrive to the system at the same time
and contract with a set of suppliers to maximize their overall surplus. Although the fixed
cost of transportation is low, experimental results indicate that it is still more beneficial for
a buyer to contract with fewer suppliers than the number of items she demands. Please note
that this may not be the case if the variance of variable transportation cost is sufficiently
high. In that case a buyer could select a different supplier for each of her items. In the
min strategy, buyer divisions arrive to the market independently. For most of the cases
two divisions of the same buyer are not assigned to the same supplier because they arrive
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at different times and the same supplier is no longer available for the division that arrives
later. Therefore in most of the instances a supplier uses all of his capacity to produce a
single item, whereas in the int strategy a supplier uses his capacity to produce two or more
items. In the int strategy, each buyer contracting with a supplier on two or more items
causes more suppliers to initiate production as compared to the min strategy. As a result,
while losses from economies of scale are high, gains from economies of scope are insignificant
in the int strategy.
Observation 4.iv indicates that the “lookahead” policy employed by the mob strategy
helps to increase the surplus compared to the min strategy, which does not consider potential
future arrivals. Observations 4.iii and 4.v show that the total surplus can increase if the
buyers either accept an offer even if the best quote is above their reservation price, or return
to the market with some probability.
We would like to note that the observations may partly depend on the experimental
settings. For instance, observation 4.ii might change if the cost values assigned to each
supplier had much smaller variance. In that case, the int strategy would not necessarily
lead to more production initiations and buyer-supplier assignments would have a similar
structure to the min strategy.
In our experimental design we limited the number of items that each buyer is willing
to buy to three, due to computational difficulties. However we conjecture that as the num-
ber of items increases, int strategy will achieve a higher total surplus in the presence of
economies of scope. When only economies of scale exist, int strategy might perform worse
due to observation 4.ii.
2.5.3 Results for average surplus per unit
Observation 5 When the capacity is low
i. e-market outperforms or does at least as well as any other strategy in maximizing the
average surplus.
ii. aoq outperforms mob and min.
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Table 15: Total surplus in different markets
Market myopic min q aoq loq mob int e-market
type
000 5031.71 4629.24 5031.71 4939.71 45031.71 4530.15 4587.78 6702.80
001 3220.01 −3494.72 4613.46 −314.21 3220.01 −1849.48 6046.07 10706.19
010 13403.87 16743.97 16175.58 21443.45 13403.87 18245.39 13680.84 29635.13
011 8417.88 5063.56 11216.48 12826.18 8417.88 6653.07 10107.94 24931.93
100 7606.56 7617.25 7647.31 7625.48 7610.80 7611.89 7750.16 8318.25
101 3557.05 700.15 6671.03 3692.67 4342.45 5970.44 12524.31 13078.07
110 18201.16 33262.55 24332.07 33654.85 20330.07 34265.37 31780.89 35950.08
111 11723.80 16596.69 18110.15 16768.02 13366.80 20299.64 30367.68 33501.98
Table 16: Comparison of the strategies with respect to total surplus in different markets
Market Performance sl
type
000 e-market > {myopic=loq=q} > aoq > {min, int, mob} 99%
001 e-market > int > q > {myopic=loq} > aoq > mob > min 99%
010 e-market > aoq > mob > {min, q} > {int, myopic=loq} 95%
011 e-market > aoq > {q, int} > {myopic=loq} > mob > min 90%
100 e-market > int > q > {aoq, min, mob, loq , myopic} 90%
101 e-market > int > {q, mob} > {loq, aoq, myopic} > min 98%
110 e-market > {mob, aoq, min} > int > q > loq > myopic 99%
111 e-market> int > {mob, aoq, q, min} > {loq, myopic} 99%
Figure 3: % difference in total surplus between e-market and next best strategy under
different market types
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Observation 6 In maximizing the average surplus,
i. myopic, q and loq perform at least as well as or better than all strategies except e-
market.
ii. min has the worst performance except when there are only economies of scale (markets
010 and 110), in which case int performs worst.
Note that the strategies which consider reservation prices (myopic, loq or q) result in
higher average surplus compared to the strategies which do not. Recall that these strategies
do not perform well in satisfying the demand (Observation 1). On the other hand, strategies
which do not consider reservation prices (min and mob) result in lower average surplus
levels, but higher percentages of satisfied demand. In these strategies it is possible that
some buyers obtain a negative surplus. These results imply a significant trade-off between
high satisfied demand and the average surplus.
In addition, under tight capacity Observation 4.i also holds for maximizing the average
surplus, i.e., mob does better when there is economies of scale and int does better when
there are economies of scope.
Table 17: Average surplus per unit in different markets
Market myopic min q aoq loq mob int e-market
type
000 6.89 6.33 6.89 6.77 6.89 6.26 6.30 9.10
001 13.52 −4.82 15.26 −0.44 13.52 −2.54 8.30 14.67
010 40.05 22.93 40.27 29.34 40.05 25.40 18.85 40.28
011 37.32 6.96 37.47 17.70 37.32 9.17 13.92 34.09
100 7.12 6.78 6.99 6.79 7.09 6.78 6.90 7.45
101 14.12 0.63 16.79 3029 15.40 5.32 11.18 12.30
110 39.54 29.60 38.25 29.94 38.74 30.49 28.28 33.28
111 40.22 14.78 38.45 14.95 39.53 18.06 27.10 35.44
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Table 18: Comparison of the strategies with respect to average surplus in different markets
Market Performance sl
type
000 e-market > {myopic=loq=q} > aoq > {min, int, mob} 99%
001 {q, e-market} > {myopic=loq} > int >aoq > mob > min 88%
010 {e-market, q, myopic=loq} > aoq > mob > min > int 99%
011 {q, myopic=loq, e-market} > aoq > int > mob > min 99%
100 e-market > myopic > loq > {q, int} > {aoq, min, mob} 90%
101 q > loq > myopic > e-market > int > mob > aoq > min 95%
110 myopic > {loq, q} > e-market > {mob, aoq, min} > int 95%
111 {myopic, loq, q} > e-market > int > mob > {aoq, min} 93%
2.5.4 Results for average cost per unit
Observation 7 e-market always has the lowest average cost, except when the capacity is
high and there are only economies of scale (market 110).
Observation 8 min has the highest average cost except when there are only economies of
scale (markets 010 and 110), in which case int has the highest average cost.
It is interesting to note that when int is not the worst performer in average cost, it is
the second best. This leads us to conclude that collaboration helps to decrease the average
cost per unit, especially when economies of scale and scope are high. In comparing mob
and int, Observation 4.i also holds for minimizing the average cost, i.e., mob does better
when there are economies of scale and int does better when there are economies of scope.
2.6 Concluding Remarks
We analyzed markets where multi-unit transactions over multiple items take place. We con-
sidered three different trading models with increasing levels of collaboration among buyers.
The “no collaboration” model considers traditional markets where there is no collaboration
among buyers or buyer divisions. In the “internal collaboration” model, purchasing divisions
of a buyer collaborate for procurement. In the “full collaboration” model an intermediary
enables collaboration among different buyers.
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Table 19: Average cost per unit in different markets
Market myopic min q aoq loq mob int e-market
type
000 16.03 16.16 16.03 16.05 16.03 16.20 16.. 15.42
001 40.83 42.61 36.45 41.25 40.83 40.49 29.44 28.31
010 26.81 29.83 24.68 28.72 26.81 27.51 33.96 23.73
011 62.70 61.55 58.84 60.75 62.70 59.58 54.44 50.44
100 15.40 15.47 15.41 15.44 15.40 15.43 15.31 14.82
101 39.81 36.95 32.32 34.31 37.14 32.26 26.41 25.02
110 22.49 22.99 20.08 22.65 21.23 22.10 24.31 21.14
111 57.04 53.14 52.07 53.00 55.18 49.86 40.76 39.59
Table 20: Comparison of the strategies with respect to average cost in different markets
Market Performance sl
type
000 {mob, min} > {aoq, q=myopic=loq, int} > e-market 99%
001 min > {aoq, myopic=loq, mob} > q > int > e-market 99%
010 int > {min, aoq} > {mob, myopic=loq} > q > e-market 95%
011 {myopic=loq, min, aoq} > {mob, q} > int > e-market 95%
100 {mob, min, aoq, q, loq, myopic, int} > e-market 99%
101 myopic> {loq, min} > aoq > {q, mob} > {int, e-market} 98%
110 int > {min, aoq, myopic, mob} > {loq, e-market} > q 80%
111 myopic > loq > {min, aoq, q} > mob > int > e-market 97%
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We developed six different buyer strategies for the no collaboration model, and one
for the internal collaboration model. These strategies are tested against the centralized
buyer-seller matching mechanism employed by the intermediary in the “full collaboration”
model.
The experimental results show that when there is tight capacity in the market and
when potential benefits from economies of scope are high (i.e., when the fixed cost of trans-
portation is high), the “full collaboration” model performs significantly better than other
strategies in terms of total surplus obtained. These benefits are much more significant when
benefits from economies of scale are also high (i.e., when the fixed costs of both manufac-
turing and transportation are high). The extra benefits obtained by full collaboration are
relatively low when the capacity is high and the fixed cost factors are low.
We also observe that internal collaboration performs very well, provided that the po-
tential benefits from economies of scope are high. On the other hand, when the potential
benefits from economies of scale are high, buyer strategies with a “look-ahead” perform
well. These are the strategies which consider potential future trades in the market by other
buyers while contracting with a supplier.
It is clear from the analysis that intermediaries will be most beneficial in capacitated
markets with a high fixed production cost and/or high fixed transportation cost. Process
industries such as rubber, plastic, steel and paper are typically characterized by high fixed
production costs. High fixed transportation costs can arise in industries that have to either
manage their own distribution fleet or establish contracts with carriers that guarantee a
minimum capacity in order to ensure adequate service levels (e.g., Ford Motor Company







Motivated by the applications of group purchasing in practice, in this chapter we study a
collaborative procurement mechanism where the supplier offers a volume discount scheme
allowing multiple buyers to pool their purchasing power and get lower prices. After pro-
curement, the buyers engage in a single-period Cournot competition and make decisions
about the quantity to sell in a market characterized by price-sensitive demand (Figure 4).
Figure 4: Representation of the collaborative procurement problem
Our objective is to characterize the Nash equilibria (purchasing quantities of the buyers)
both under independent and joint procurement and investigate under which conditions
joint procurement benefits the buyers. Having characterized the buyers’ response to a
given supply price function, we then consider the supplier’s decision of choosing β, and the
conditions under which the supplier is better off due to joint procurement.
In Section 3.2, we discuss the literature relevant to the problem, and state how our
study differs from the existing ones. The mathematical model in Section 3.3 is followed
by Section 3.4 where we consider uncapacitated buyers. In Section 3.5, we consider buyers
with different capacity levels (sizes) and see how the benefits differ from the uncapacitated
case. Insights and concluding remarks constitute the final section of this chapter.
35
3.2 Literature Review
The collaborative efforts among supply chain participants have been analyzed along several
lines. In supply chain literature mainly vertical relationships between buyers and suppliers
have been considered. There is a growing body of work on supply chain coordination which
discusses contracting mechanisms (Lariviere 1999; Anupindi and Bassok 1999; Cachon 1999)
such as return policies (Emmons and Gilbert 1998; Pasternack 1985), rebates, revenue
sharing (Cachon and Lariviere 2002; Taylor 2002), and price protection (Lee et al. 2000).
Most studies analyze horizontal collaboration in the research and development (R&D)
and research joint ventures context (D’Aspremont and Jacquemin 1988; Kamien, Muller
and Zang 1992; Cabral 2000). These models consider the interaction among the firms that
are partners in R&D investment but competitors in the end market. Essig (2000) shows
through an empirical study of consortium sourcing among 13 small and medium-sized Ger-
man companies that consortium sourcing can be beneficial to all involved members. Zentes
and Swoboda (2000) discuss the IT network structures of groups of small to medium-sized
retailers in Central Europe. They conclude that modern information and communication
technologies allow these allied groups to set up complex networks, which help members to
safeguard their competitive positions in the market.
For the buyers, the main motivation behind the formation of buyer groups or group
purchasing organizations is the quantity discounts provided by the suppliers. In a quantity
discount scheme, the supplier sets price break(s) (Lam and Wong 1996) or uses continuous
pricing (Ladany and Sternlieb 1974; Lal and Staelin 1984; Dave, Fitzpatrick and Baker
1996). Dolan (1987) provides a thorough analysis and categorization of the studies on
quantity discounts. The main motivations for the suppliers according to Buchanan (1953)
are, (i) price discrimination against buyer(s), (ii) to pass part of the supply chain costs on
to the buyer and/or to increase overall system efficiency, by changing the buyer’s ordering
pattern.
A significant portion of the supply chain literature on quantity discounts focuses on
the second motivation: achieving cost minimization from supplier’s (or buyer’s) perspec-
tive and/or achieving overall cost minimization through channel coordination. Introducing
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quantity discounts changes the ordering quantity of the buyer and this reduces the supply
chain related costs such as inventory holding, order replenishment or purchasing (see Lal
and Staelin 1984; Rosenblatt and Lee 1985; Weng 1995). If the demand is price-sensitive,
discounting would attract more demand, benefiting the supplier. Among the studies in
supply chain literature that consider price-sensitive demand are Abad (1994), Parlar and
Wang (1994) and Yang (2004). On the other hand, most of the studies on quantity dis-
counts in the economics literature focus on the first motivation and try to design an optimal
discount scheme that extracts all or some of the consumer surplus (see Oi 1971; Katz 1984;
Armstrong 1996).
Research on collaborative relations and group-buying include Mathewson and Winter
(1996), Spiegel (1993) and Anand and Aron (2003). Mathewson and Winter (1996) study a
problem where a group of buyers negotiates and makes a contract with a group of suppliers
to get lower prices. In turn, the buyer group gets supplies only from the contracting group
which implies a trade-off between low price and low product availability. They conclude
that as the number of suppliers increases, the buyer group is more likely to benefit from
contracts and buyer groups might be welfare increasing or decreasing depending on the
model’s parameters. Spiegel (1993) addresses production sub-contracting between two rival
firms operating at the same horizontal stage in the supply chain. He shows that this
arrangement, if it occurs at all, always increases production efficiency. Anand and Aron
(2003) study the optimal design of an online business-to-customer group-buying scheme
under demand uncertainty. In their model, the buyers arrive and demand single units,
and as the number of units demanded increases the price drops. The demand function is
not known to the supplier before he decides on price-quantity tuples. Under this setting,
the supplier’s benefit from group-buying increases as demand heterogeneity (the difference
in the slopes of the demand curves of the buyers) increases. Furthermore, group-buying
outperforms single pricing when the goods are produced after total demand is realized
under scale economies.
We consider collaborative procurement in a business-to-business setting, where the buy-
ers collaborate for procurement and then compete in the end market. Being potential
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competitors affects the purchasing quantities of the buyers. Furthermore, we consider the
case where buyers have limited capacities, which affects their purchasing power. We con-
sider the purchasing strategies of the buyers and the selling strategy of the supplier and
identify the conditions under which all parties benefit from group purchasing.
3.3 Model
Our model has the following characteristics. There is one supplier and two buying firms,
both of whom procure input from the supplier and then produce/sell a homogeneous prod-
uct. We assume that the buyers are identical in terms of their production costs which we
characterize by constant returns to scale. Without loss of generality, we assume that the
unit production cost is zero, i.e., the only cost for the buyers is the cost of procurement of
the input materials from the supplier. We assume that the market price per unit is given by
P = a− bQ where Q is the demand (or total quantity sold by the buying firms) in the end
market. Such linear downward sloping price/demand functions are commonly used in the
economics and operations management literature (see for instance, Albaek 1990; Corbett
and Karmarkar 2001).
The unit supply prices under independent (I) and joint (J) procurement are given by:
SIi = c1 − c2qIi , i = 1, 2 (12)
SJi = c1 − c2(qJi + βqJj ), β ∈ [0, 1], i, j = 1, 2 and i 6= j (13)
Note that uniform price is a special case of the above price structure with c2 = 0. In case
of joint procurement, buyers consolidate their order quantities in order to get a better price
deal from the supplier. β is the spillover factor, which determines the additional discount
that a buyer gets due to the quantity purchased by the other buyer. The extreme cases are
β = 0, which corresponds to independent procurement; and β = 1, which implies complete
spillover, i.e., the two buyers can act as a single buyer and thus each buyer could achieve
the maximum benefit from the reduction in the supply price.
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If buyers i and j produce/procure qi and qj , respectively, then Revi(qi, qj) = (a− b(qi +
qj))qi denotes the revenue and Ci(qi, qj) = (c1 − c2(qi + βqj))qi denotes the cost of buyer
i. Hence, the marginal revenue and marginal cost of buyer i are given by MRi(qi, qj) =
a − b(2qi + qj) and MCi(qi, qj) = c1 − c2(2qi + βqj). As qi increases, both MRi and MCi
decreases, at the rates 2b and 2c2, respectively. We make the following assumptions:
A1. b > c2: Marginal revenue falls faster than the marginal cost as the quantity procured
increases, i.e., the quantities are bounded.
A2. a > c1: Market price is greater than the supply price for the first unit, i.e., it is
profitable to procure a positive quantity.
A3. a < c1 bc2 : Total procurement cost for buyer i is an increasing function of the
quantity purchased, qi (see Appendix A.1).
We assume that all the parameters of the model are common knowledge and all parties
are profit maximizers. As a building block we first analyze the single supplier-single buyer
(monopoly) model, where the supply price is given by S = c1 − c2q. The buyer solves the
following optimization problem to find the order quantity that maximizes his profits:
max
q≥0
πM = (a− bq − (c1 − c2q))q.






By assumptions A1 and A2, qM > 0.
3.4 Uncapacitated Buyers
In this section we consider the case of uncapacitated buyers. We analyze the procurement
decisions of two independent buyers under joint and independent procurement given a sup-
ply price function. After characterizing the buyers’ behavior, we then study the supplier’s
choice of β.
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3.4.1 Buyers’ Procurement Decisions
Consider the procurement decisions of two independent buyers. Given buyer j’s procure-
ment/production decision qj , buyer i’s profit maximization problem is:
max
qi≥0
πi = Revi(qi, qj)− Ci(qi, qj)
=
(




c1 − c2(qi + βqj)
)
qi, i, j = 1, 2 and i 6= j
(15)
Note that when β = 0 the expression above models independent procurement and




c2) < 0) the profit function is concave. Hence, from first order conditions
∂πi
∂qi
= (a− 2bqi − bqj)− (c1 − 2c2qi − βc2qj) (16)
The best response of buyer i, qi = Ri(qj), which maximizes πi for a given qj is given by
qi = Ri(qj) = ri(qj)+ (17)






qj , i, j = 1, 2 and i 6= j (18)
Let us consider the conditions under which ri(qj) attains its maximum value or becomes
0. Since qj is non-negative, ri(qj) is bounded above by ri(0) = qM , the monopoly quantity.





That is, if qj > q̄, the marginal revenue of procuring any positive amount is less than
the marginal cost for buyer firm i. Furthermore, if firm j procures qj , the market price is
at most P (0 + qj) and the supply price of purchasing the first unit for firm i is at least
Si(0, qj). When qj ≥ q̄, we have P (0+qj)−Si(0, qj) ≤ 0, i.e., firm i’s profit of procuring the
first unit is negative. Since by Assumption A1, the market price falls faster than the supply
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price, the marginal profit of procuring additional units would always remain negative for
firm i. Therefore, when qj ≥ q̄, firm i’s best response is not to procure at all. Hence, q̄
denotes the minimum quantity a firm needs to procure to leave the other firm completely
out of the market. Note that q̄ increases in β. When β > βc, where βc = 2− bc2 , q̄ exceeds
qM and, at equilibrium, it is not possible for a firm to leave the other firm out of market.
q̄ and qM are the points where r1 and r2, respectively, intercept the q2 axis in Figure 5.
We have to consider the following three cases depending on the relationship between q̄ and
qM :
Case A. q̄ > qM , equivalently, β > βc (Figure 5.(A)).
Case B. q̄ < qM , equivalently, β < βc (Figure 5.(B)).
Case C. q̄ = qM , equivalently, β = βc (Figure 5.(C)).
At βc, the system switches from Case A to Case B. Under independent procurement
(β = 0) we obtain the conditions for Case A as b > 2c2 and for Case B as b < 2c2.
It is interesting to note that if we had a constant unit supply price, c1, instead of a
quantity discount schedule, we would have q̄ > qM . This implies at qi = qM , MRj−MCj >
0 and it is not possible for a firm to leave the other firm completely out of market. However,
under the quantity discount schedule, the marginal cost of procuring the initial unit may
be greater than the marginal revenue (depending on the other firm’s current procurement
quantity) and a firm may choose not to procure/sell.
In Case A, we have a unique equilibrium (qU , qU ) where
qU =
a− c1
3b− (2 + β)c2
(20)







The profits of the buyers are
πi(qU , qU ) = (b− c2)(qU )2, i = 1, 2 (22)
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In Case B, there exist two additional (pure strategy) equilibria, (0, qM ) and (qM , 0).
In Case C, any (q1, q2) pair is an equilibrium as long as it satisfies Equation (18) (see
Figure 5.(C)).
We focus on Cases A and B.
Figure 5: Reaction functions under Case A, Case B and Case C
Observation 9 In equilibrium, the total quantity procured by the two buying firms increases




Observation 10 Under equilibrium (qU , qU ), the total quantity procured by the two buying
firms increases as β increases.
These observations follow directly from Equations (14) and (20). They can also be
explained intuitively. All other parameters being fixed, the larger the value of ac1 , i.e., the
larger the difference between the base supply price and the base market price, the more
the buyers can procure before the marginal cost becomes higher than the marginal revenue.
Similarly, the smaller the value of bc2 , i.e., the smaller the difference between the rate of
decline of the supply price and the market price, the more the buyers can procure before
the marginal cost becomes higher than the marginal revenue. Finally, a larger value of β
makes the supply price fall faster and it effectively makes the value of bc2 smaller.
Observation 11 Under equilibrium (qU , qU ), uncapacitated buyer firms and end consumers
are better off under joint procurement as compared to independent procurement.
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If the equilibrium is (qU , qU ), qU increases in β (Equation (20)) and the profits of the
buying firms increase in qU (Equation (22)), making the buying firms better off under
joint procurement. Total quantity produced under joint procurement is higher compared
to independent procurement, and since the market price P = a− bQ decreases in the total
quantity, the end consumers are also better off under joint procurement.
3.4.2 Supplier’s Choice of β when the Buyers are Uncapacitated
We analyzed uncapacitated buyers’ procurement decisions given the supply price function
in Equation (13). We now consider how the supplier’s choice of β impacts the profits.
In choosing β, the supplier needs to trade-off the decrease in the revenue due to quantity
discounts and the increase in revenue due to the increase in the quantity sold.
Recall from Figure 5 that if the supplier sets β > βc, then the unique equilibrium is
(qU , qU ). If the supplier sets β < βc, then there exist two additional pure strategy equilibria,
(0, qM ) and (qM , 0).
The decision mechanism of the supplier is characterized as below:
1. The supplier determines the β that maximizes his profits under equilibrium (qU , qU );
call this β∗U , where β
∗
U ∈ [0, 1].
2.a. If b > 2c2, then the unique equilibrium is (q∗U , q
∗






supplier sets β = β∗U .
b. If b < 2c2, then the supplier may choose to set β < βc and sell (qM , 0). Note




U ) and πS(qM , 0).
Let us first identify the β that maximizes the supplier’s profit under (qU , qU ). The
supplier’s profit function is:
πJS(β) = 2(c1 − c2qU (1 + β))qU










For β ∈ [0, 1], ∂π
J
S
∂β is positive for β < β
∗ and negative for β > β∗. This implies that the
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β that maximizes the supplier’s profit (πJS) is given by,
β∗U =













From Equation (24), if β∗U > 0 (equivalently, β
∗ > 0), then the supplier is better off under
joint procurement. This is more likely to be the case for low values of ac1 and high values
of bc2 , i.e., if the initial market price is low relative to the base supply price or if the market
price decreases rapidly as compared to the supply price. Conversely, if β∗U = 0 (equivalently,
β∗ ≤ 0), the supplier is more likely to be better off under independent procurement. This
happens under high values of ac1 and low values of
b
c2
, where the quantities procured by
the buyers are already high, therefore it is not beneficial for the supplier to give additional
discounts.
If β∗ < 0 (β∗ > 1), then this is an indication that the supplier is offering higher (lower)
discounts than she should. In this case, decreasing (increasing) c2 would limit (increase)
the discount level and increase the supplier’s profits.
The following proposition shows the supplier’s optimal decision when the buyers are
uncapacitated. For expositional clarity we present the proofs in Appendix A.
Proposition 1 When the buyers are uncapacitated, the supplier maximizes her profit by
setting β = β∗U and by selling q
∗
U to each buyer.
Proposition 1 implies that, both under independent and joint procurement, rather than
selling a large quantity to a single buyer, the supplier is always better off by selling smaller
and equal quantities to both buyers. She can achieve this by limiting the quantity she sells
to any buyer to q∗U .
3.5 Capacitated Buyers
In this section, we assume that the buying firms have limited production capacities K1 and
K2, where without loss of generality K1 > K2. Having capacity limitations restricts the
44
buyers’ procurement/production quantities and impacts how much they (or the supplier)
can benefit from joint procurement.
Intuitively, one would think that a “large” buyer (with higher capacity, buyer 1 in this
case) would have less incentive to collaborate with a smaller buyer on procurement, since
the large buyer already has enough volume to obtain a good price from the supplier. The
“small” buyer, on the other hand, might prefer to collaborate with a large buyer, since
it will obtain additional price breaks due to the volume of the large buyer. Given these
conflicting incentives, we might expect that joint procurement would occur mainly among
roughly equal size buyers (in terms of capacity and purchase volume).
However, we find that depending on the market characteristics, collaboration may occur
among different size buyers. Furthermore, depending on the capacity of the large buyer,
the small buyer may not always be willing to collaborate.
3.5.1 Buyers’ Procurement Decisions
First, we analyze the buyers’ procurement decisions in equilibrium, given the supply price
function in Equation (13). From (15)-(18), the best response of buyer i is,
Ri(qj) = min{Ki, ri(qj)+} (25)
We say that buyer i has “tight” capacity, if Ki < qU , has “medium” capacity, if qU ≤
Ki < qM , and has “ample” capacity, if qM ≤ Ki (the capacity ranges are defined similarly
for independent procurement by replacing qU with qIU ). Note that qU is a function of β. This
implies that whether the buyer’s capacity is tight or medium depends on the relationship
between Ki and β. For instance, a buyer may have medium capacity under independent
procurement and tight capacity under joint procurement.
From Equation (25), if both buyers have Ki ≥ qM , this is equivalent to the uncapacitated
case. Therefore without loss of generality, we assume K2 < K1 ≤ qM (Note that even if
K1 > qM , buyer 1 will never procure more than qM , hence without loss of generality we can
assume K1 ≤ qM ).
We obtain the equilibrium (equilibria) for a given β, under the cases where buyer 2 has
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tight capacity and medium capacity. The analysis holds for all β ∈ [0, 1]. Note that for
β = 0, the analysis corresponds to independent procurement.
Theorem 1 If buyer 2 has tight capacity (K2 < qU ), the equilibrium procurement quantities
are characterized as follows:
β > βc: (q1, q2) = (min{K1, r1(K2)},K2).
β < βc: (q1, q2) = (K1,min{K2, r2(K1)+}).
Theorem 2 If buyer 2 has medium capacity (qU ≤ K2 < qM ), the equilibrium procurement
quantities are characterized as follows:
β > βc: (q1, q2) = (qU , qU ).
β < βc: (q1, q2) = (qU , qU ) or (K1, r2(K1)+) or (r1(K2)+,K2).
A list of all possible equilibria with respect to K1, K2 and β values is presented in Table
21. Figure 6 shows how the equilibria (equilibrium) change(s) with respect to K1 and K2
for a given β value.
Table 21: Total characterization of equilibria
β > βc β < βc
E1 (K1,K2) K1 ≤ r1(K2) K2 ≤ r2(K1)
E2 (qU , qU ) K1,K2 ≥ qU K1,K2 ≥ qU
E3 (K1, r2(K1)) - K1 ≤ q̄, K2 ≥ r2(K1)
E4 (K1, 0) - K1 ≥ q̄
E5 (r1(K2),K2) K2 ≤ qU , K1 ≥ r1(K2) K2 ≤ q̄, K1 ≥ r1(K2)
E6 (0,K2) - K2 ≥ q̄
Next we analyze, for a given (K1,K2), how the equilibrium changes with respect to β.
We take β = 0 (independent procurement) as a starting point. There exist 10 (mutually
exclusive) cases when buyer 2’s capacity is tight under independent procurement (K2 < qIU ),
and 9 cases when buyer 2’s capacity is medium under independent procurement (qIU ≤
K2 ≤ qM ). We present a summary of these cases in Figures 7 and 8, respectively. See
Appendix A.4 for the analysis of why each condition leads to a particular series of equilibria.
In Table 22, we list and explain the β values of Figures 7 and 8, at which the equilibrium
switches from one to another. For example at β51 the equilibrium switches from E5 to E1,
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Figure 6: All possible equilibria of Theorem 1 and 2 for a given β, as a function of K1
and K2
i.e., r1(K2) becomes equal to K1. Similarly, β2 indicates the value at which buyer 2’s
capacity switches from medium to tight (note, E2 corresponds to the case where buyer 2
has medium capacity).
In Figure 8 we assume that there exists a single equilibrium, E2, for β < β2 (although
Theorem 2 states that there exist three equilibria when β < βc and buyer 2 has medium
capacity). However, in Proposition 3 of Section 3.5.2 we show that the supplier’s optimal
decision is to sell equal quantities to each buyer, rather than (K1, r2(K1)+) or (r1(K2)+,K2),
whenever the optimal β for the supplier is less than β2. Therefore in the remainder of our
analysis, we only consider E2 when β < β2.
Table 22: β values at switching points
Equilibria Condition β
E5 to E1 r1(K2) = K1 β51 =
bK2−(a−c1)+2(b−c2)K1
c2K2
E3 to E1 r2(K1) = K2 β31 =
bK1−(a−c1)+2(b−c2)K2
c2K1
E3 to E5 b = (2− β)c2 βc = 2− bc2
E4 to E3 r2(K1) = 0 β43 =
bK1−(a−c1)
c2K1
E2 to E3, E4 or E5 qJU = K2 β2 =
(3b−2c2)K2−(a−c1)
c2K2
In the following examples, we show how different market conditions, buyer capacities
and discount levels affect buyers’ willingness to collaborate.
Example 2.a. Suppose a = 100, c1 = 88, b = 1, c2 = 0.7, K1 = 10 and K2 = 6.
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Figure 7: All possible equilibria of Theorem 1 and Theorem 2 as a function of β for a
given (K1,K2), when buyer 2 has tight capacity under independent procurement
We have qIU = 7.5, q̄ = 12, qM = 20, and the system conditions are such that, K2 < q
I
U ,
b < 2c2, K1 ≥ q̄, and qM − b2(b−c2)K1 ≤ K2 < qM − K1. Hence the system is in Case 5.
The equilibrium is E3 at β = 0, and switches to E1 at β31 = 0.228. The profits of the two
buyers and the supplier for β ∈ [0, 1] are shown in Figure 9.a.
From Figure 9.a, buyer 1 prefers collaboration if β is sufficiently high (β > β′). Under
independent procurement, buyer 1 procures at capacity, whereas buyer 2 procures r2(K1).
As β increases, buyer 1 still procures at capacity, whereas procurement quantity of buyer
2 increases. This results in a decrease in buyer 1’s profit. In other words, for buyer 1, the
decrease in the supply price due to β does not outweigh the decrease in the market price.
However, once β reaches β31, both buyers procure at capacity and the market price does not
decrease as β increases, whereas the supply price continues to decrease. When the decrease
in the supply price is sufficiently high, buyer 1 prefers joint procurement over independent
procurement. As we will see in Proposition 2, for this example β′ = 0.635. Buyer 2 prefers
collaboration for all β ∈ (0, 1], since the decrease in the supply price outweighs the decrease
in the market price for β ∈ (0, 1]. The supplier’s profit is maximized at β31, however, she is
better off if buyers collaborate as compared to independent procurement, for all β ∈ (0, 1].
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Figure 8: All possible equilibria of Theorem 1 and Theorem 2 as a function of β for a
given (K1,K2), when buyer 2 has medium capacity under independent procurement
Figure 9: Profits of the buyers and the supplier in Cases 5, 9 and 18 for β ∈ [0, 1].
Example 2.b. Suppose a = 100, c1 = 88, b = 1, c2 = 0.6, K1 = 12.5 and K2 = 4.
We have qIU = 6.67, q̄ = 12, qM = 15, and the system is in Case 9. Buyer 1 does not
prefer collaboration for β ∈ (0, 1] (actually he prefers collaboration if β ≥ β′ = 1.92),
whereas buyer 2 prefers collaboration for all β ∈ (0, 1]. The supplier’s profit is maximized
at β51 = 0.83. However, due to buyer 1, collaboration does not take place in this example
(Figure 9.b).
Example 2.c. Suppose a = 100, c1 = 88, b = 1, c2 = 0.8, K1 = 21 and K2 = 10.
We have qIU = 8.57, q̄ = 12, qM = 30, and the system is in Case 18. Buyer 1 prefers
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collaboration for all β ∈ (0, 1], whereas buyer 2 prefers collaboration if β is sufficiently
small or sufficiently high (if β < β2 = 0.25 or β > β′′ = 0.74). The supplier’s profit is
maximized at β51 = 0.8. At 0.8, both buyers are willing to collaborate (Figure 9.c).
Knowing how the equilibrium changes as β changes helps the supplier to choose the
optimal or the best feasible β values. By optimal β, we refer to the β that maximizes the
supplier’s profit, whereas, by best feasible β, we refer to the β that maximizes the supplier’s
profit at which both buyers are willing to collaborate. Recall that, when the buyers are
uncapacitated, the optimal β is also the best feasible β, since for all β ∈ (0, 1], the buyers
prefer joint procurement. However when they are capacitated, a buyer may or may not
prefer joint procurement, depending on β.
In Example 2.a, while β31 is optimal for the supplier, buyer 1 would not be willing to
collaborate at β = β31. Hence the best feasible β is β′, at which both buyers are willing
to collaborate. As in Example 2.a, there might exist a β that maximizes the supplier’s
profit, however, if at least one buyer is worse off at that value (compared to independent
procurement), the supplier would have to compromise. Therefore, in Proposition 2 we
determine the conditions at which the buyers prefer joint procurement, and then based on
those conditions, in Proposition 4 we analyze the supplier’s choice of β.
Proposition 2 (1) If buyer 2 has tight capacity under independent procurement (K2 < qIU ),
then he is better off under joint procurement. Buyer 1 is better off if and only if b > 2c2 or




(2) If buyer 2 has medium capacity under independent procurement (K2 ≥ qIU ), then
buyer 1 is better off under joint procurement. Buyer 2 is better off if and only if one of the
following holds:
(i) K2 ≥ a−c14(b−c2) ,
(ii) β ≤ β2,




Proposition 2 shows that, for each buyer there exists a threshold β (possibly = 0 or > 1),
such that when the supplier sets β above the threshold value of the buyer, the buyer prefers
50
joint procurement. These threshold values may be different for each buyer, i.e., it is possible
to have β values where one buyer is willing to collaborate whereas the other buyer is not.
Furthermore, the threshold values change as market conditions and the buyers’ capacities
change (see also Examples 2.a, 2.b and 2.c).
The existence of threshold values can be explained intuitively. The decrease in the
supply price due to β is an incentive for the buyers to collaborate. Note that, there exists a
β at which the equilibrium quantities are (K1,K2). For higher values of β, the market price
stays constant at a−b(K1+K2), whereas the supply price decreases. Therefore there should
be a β (which is an upper bound on the threshold values) that makes the buyers better off
under joint procurement. This means, if the supplier gives enough quantity discounts, then
buyers should be willing to collaborate.
Under joint procurement, at least one of the buyers increases his procurement quantity
at equilibrium, unless there are capacity restrictions. That is, as β increases MC decreases
for both buyers, and this is an incentive for the buyers to procure more. The proof of
Proposition 2 indicates that, if the procurement quantity of a buyer increases under joint
procurement, the buyer prefers joint procurement and if the quantity decreases under joint
procurement, the buyer prefers independent procurement. If the quantity is the same under
joint procurement, the supplier should give sufficient discount for the buyer to collaborate.
Buyer 1 does not collaborate in Cases 6-10 (since either the buyer’s procurement quan-
tity decreases under joint procurement or his threshold β value exceeds 1). In Case 5,
collaboration may or may not take place depending on β. For all other cases, buyer 1
prefers collaboration. If buyer 1 is procuring at capacity under independent procurement,
K1 and K2 being “low” (K1 < a−c1b and K1 + K2 < qM ) is a necessary condition for him
to collaborate. The reason is, if K1 or K2 is “low”, although the procurement quantity of
buyer 2 increases under joint procurement, the amount of increase is limited.
The procurement quantity of buyer 2 possibly decreases under joint procurement, only in
Cases 14-19 (depending on β). If K1 is “low”with respect to K2, then buyer 2 collaborates
under a wide range of parameter settings, since under “low” K1, buyer 2’s procurement
quantity under joint procurement increases (for instance, if K1K2 < 1 − q
I
U/qM , buyer 2
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collaborates for any β). See Figure 10 for a summary of the cases and the conditions under
which each buyer prefers collaboration.
Observation 12 When buyers are capacitated, end consumers are better off under joint
procurement.
Proposition 2 implies that, if joint procurement takes place, then each buyer’s pro-
curement quantity either increases or stays the same, whereas at least one of the buyers
increases his procurement quantity. As a result, in the end market the total production
quantity increases, the price decreases and the end consumers are better off.
3.5.2 Supplier’s Choice of β when the Buyers are Capacitated
In this section we analyze the supplier’s choice of β. Let β∗C ∈ [0, 1] denote the β that
maximizes the supplier’s profit function when the buyers are capacitated. As β increases
from 0 to 1, the system may pass through several equilibria as indicated in Cases 1-19 of
Figures 7 and 8. The supplier finds the β values that maximizes her profit function under
each equilibrium, and compares those profits to find the β that achieves the maximum
profit. Since the system passes through different equilibria, the supplier’s profit function
may have discontinuities at the switching β values.
We characterize β∗C for each of the 19 cases in Theorem 3. When there exist multiple
equilibria, each equilibrium leads to a different profit, therefore how much to sell to each
buyer is also a decision the supplier has to make when determining β∗C . In Proposition 3 we




. This enables us to assume under 0 ≤ β ≤ β2, E2 is the only equilibrium.
Proposition 3 When the buyers are capacitated, for β∗C ≤ β2 the supplier maximizes her
profit by selling q∗C to each buyer.
Proposition 3 implies if optimal decision of the supplier is to sell (K1, r2(K1)+), then
β∗C > β2.
Theorem 3 β∗C is characterized as in Figure 10.
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Analysis in Theorem 3 indicates that β∗C is never equal to β43, i.e., it is never optimal
for the supplier to sell (K1, 0). This, together with Proposition 3 imply, rather than selling
a large quantity to a single buyer, the supplier prefers selling to both buyers in smaller
quantities. This result is similar to Proposition 1 of Section 3.4.2.
Figure 10: The β∗C ∈ [0, 1] values that maximizes the supplier’s profit function for each of
the 19 Cases.
If β∗C = 0, the supplier does not offer a discount. If β
∗
C > 0, the supplier checks whether
the buyers are willing to collaborate. If either buyer is not willing to collaborate at β∗C , the
supplier may change β by considering the β values given in Proposition 2. In Figure 10 we
also present for each of the 19 cases, whether each buyer is willing to collaborate. Proposition
4 characterizes the supplier’s profit maximizing strategy under capacitated buyers.
Proposition 4 The profit maximizing strategy of the supplier when the buyers are capaci-
tated is as follows:
(1) In Cases 1-4 or 11-13, β = β∗C .
(2) In Case 5, if 1 − r2(K1)K2 <
c2
b and c1 > c2(K2 + r2(K1)) + b(2K1), then β = β
′,
otherwise β = 0.
(3) In Cases 6-10, collaboration does not take place.
(4) In Cases 14-19,
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(a) If β∗C 6= β3 or β∗C = β3 ≥ β′′, β = β∗C .
(b) If β∗C = β3 < β
′′, buyer 2 does not collaborate at β∗C . For Cases 14 and 17,
β =argmax{πS(min{β2, β∗U}), πS(β′′)}, and for Cases 15,16, 18 and 19,
β =argmax{πS(min{β2, β∗U}), πS(β′′), πS(βc)}.
Note that, if collaboration does not take place it is either due to buyer 1 or due to the
supplier. Buyer 2 and the supplier could always compromise on a β that both would agree
(unless β∗U = 0). This implies, although willing to collaborate with the small buyer in most
cases, the large buyer has more impact on the collaboration process.
Below, we present an example where buyer 2 is not willing to collaborate at β∗C .
Example 3. Suppose a = 124, c1 = 88, b = 1, c2 = 0.7, K1 = 37.49 and K2 = 22.51.
We have qIU = 22.5, q̄ = 36, qM = 60, and the system falls under Case 18. The β values are,
β2 = 0.001, β∗U = 0.378, β3 = 0.568, β
c = 0.5714, and β5 = 0.296. β2 < β3 < βc, therefore:




Since buyer 2 has medium capacity, from Proposition 2 buyer 1 is willing to collaborate
for all β ∈ (0, 1] and buyer 2 is willing to collaborate if β < β2 or if β >min{βc, β′′}.
β′′ = 0.5712 > β3. In this example supplier compromises by setting β∗C = β
′′. Table 23
shows the profits of the two buyers and the supplier under independent procurement, in
comparison with the profits under β∗C and β
′′.
Table 23: Example 3: A comparison of the profits of the buyers and the supplier
q1 q2 π1 π2 πS
Independent 22.5 22.5 151.88 151.88 3251.25
Joint (β∗C) 37.49 22.37 422.89 150.17 3266.38
Joint (β′′) 37.49 22.51 421.74 151.88 3266.34
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3.6 Concluding Remarks
We have shown that if the market conditions are appropriate, cooperation between com-
peting firms provides benefits for all participants. We analyzed two cases with respect
to buyers’ capacities. When the buyers are uncapacitated, their procurement quantities
increase under joint procurement, and as a result they are willing to collaborate for any
discount given by the supplier. When the buyers are capacitated, each buyer is willing
to collaborate for certain discount levels, provided that he could increase his procurement
quantity under joint procurement. Intuitively, one would think that a small buyer would
always prefer collaborating with a large buyer. However, our study indicates that depending
on large buyer’s capacity and the discount level, the small buyer may not find it beneficial
to procure jointly. For both the uncapacitated and the capacitated cases, total quantity in
the end market increases under joint procurement, and end users are better off.
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CHAPTER IV
DYNAMIC DUE-DATE QUOTATION FOR BASE-STOCK
INVENTORY SYSTEMS
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we consider a due date quotation and inventory keeping problem of a
retailer/manufacturer. The demand occurs in the form of customer arrivals. If there are
items in stock then demand is met immediately, while an order is placed for a new item. If
there are no available items in stock, then the customer has to wait until an item arrives
from the depot, in which case he is quoted a due date. If the item arrives later than the time
quoted to the customer, a lateness cost is incurred per part, per unit time. Furthermore a
holding cost is incurred per item, per unit time for any unassigned item that waits in the
inventory. This type of problem can also arise in a repair facility of a manufacturer. In that
case instead of ordering an item from the depot, the part is placed into repair.
In our problem the customers are sensitive to the quoted due dates; as the quoted due
date increases, the customer is less likely to place his order. If the customer places his order,
he brings a revenue. Given these settings, our objective is to find the optimal inventory
level and the optimal due date policy.
General Electric (GE) Medical Systems provides a relevant industry practice for our
problem definition. In GE Medical Systems, service parts are categorized as “consumable”
and “exchange” items. The exchange items are the parts than can be repaired and are
priced below the full price. The customer places an order, receives a replacement part and
sends the defective part within 30 days of the receipt.1
In Section 4.2 we review the literature on due date quotation. In Section 4.3, we make a
structural analysis of the optimal due date quotation policy under a given base-stock level
1http://www.gehealthcare.com/services/repl parts/faq.html
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and obtain insights on the optimal base-stock level. In Section 4.4 we conduct experiments
to identify the conditions under which keeping inventory is beneficial. We present our
concluding remarks in Section 4.5.
4.2 Literature Review
There exists voluminous amount of work on due date quotation. Researchers have been
studying different aspects of the problem such as developing scheduling/sequencing algo-
rithms to meet due dates, quoting lead-times to maximize profit, or to minimize cost, subject
to some service level constraint. In many cases, the revenue obtained per job, holding cost
and earliness/lateness penalties are the main elements of the models. The production envi-
ronments can be deterministic versus stochastic with lead-time sensitive versus insensitive
customers. If customers are lead-time sensitive, the due date policy implicitly controls the
customer arrivals to the system. Several papers take into consideration the long-run effects
of the due date quotation policy. In this section, we present a representative subset of the
due date quotation literature.
A line of research focus on scheduling/sequencing customer orders to meet an objective
such as minimizing average tardiness, maximum lateness or an aggregate cost function. Ke-
skinocak and Tayur (2003) provides a thorough survey on coordinated scheduling and due
date quotation. In some of the studies the lead-times are customer-specified, all arriving
orders are accepted (ElHafsi 2000), and the processing times are deterministic (Chhajed and
Chand 1992), but there exist exceptions. Keskinocak, Ravi and Tayur (2001) consider both
scheduling and lead-time quotation decisions under lead-time sensitive revenue. Duenyas
and Hopp (1995) models a due date quotation problem with stochastic arrival and process-
ing times and find an optimal sequencing rule to maximize profit with lead-time sensitive
customers.
In our model the due dates are set by the manufacturer. There exist a body of work
that considers endogenous due date quotation. In some studies, the due-date decisions
are based on a service constraint. Hopp and Sturgis (2001) construct a dynamic due date
quotation policy to minimize average lead-times subject to various service level constraints.
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Spearman and Zhang (1999) compare two types of service level constraints; fraction of
tardy jobs versus average tardiness, where first type leads to unethical policies. So and
Song (1998) consider a manufacturer’s price, lead-time and capacity decisions under service
level constraints. On the other hand, some papers consider a profit or cost function with
lateness cost component instead of a service level constraint. Weng (1999) studies a problem
with holding, earliness and tardiness costs, and conclude that the optimal lead-time is
the manufacturing flow time adjusted by earliness and tardiness costs. Dellaert (1991)
considers a model with earliness/lateness penalties. Dellaert (1991) and So and Song (1998)
also consider the affect of customer sensitivity on due date decisions. Similarly Palaka,
Erlebacher and Kropp (1992) study a model where price and lead-time are the two decision
variables which affect demand. Several papers incorporate the affect of accepting a customer
on system congestion and future due date decisions (Duenyas and Hopp 1995; Duenyas
1995), whereas others do not (Chatterjee, Slotnick and Sobel 2002; Weng 1999). Our work
differs from the previous literature in the sense that we consider an initial inventory as a
means to increase responsiveness. The due date decisions are set endogenously and depend
on the workload status in the system. Furthermore, future effects of accepting an order
on system congestion is considered. We do not consider a service level constraint, rather
maximize a profit function that includes a lateness cost component. See Figure 11 for a
classification of previous work that are relevant to our problem and how our study differs
from the existing ones.
Determining the type of the manufacturing environment is another objective in our
study. Li (1992) studies a manufacturer’s production policy where price, production cost,
holding cost and quoted lead-times are exogenous, and finds that the optimal policy is to
operate under a base-stock inventory system. The conditions for a make-to-order (MTO)
system is determined and the change in the likelihood of the firms to keep inventory is
analyzed with respect to competition. Rajagopalan (2002) studies a production system
where items could be make-to-order or make-to-stock. He shows that it may not be always
true that low demand items should be MTO and high demand items should be make-to-
stock. Veatch and Wein (1994) model the production system as tandem stations with queues
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Figure 11: A classification of previous studies on due date quotation and a comparison
with our study
where production rates can be controlled under the presence of inventory and backordering
costs. Their objective is to identify the conditions that different production policies such
as Kanban or base-stock are preferred. In our work we control the arrival rates (by quoting
due dates) instead of production rates, and determine when to operate under MTO versus
under base-stock systems.
4.3 Model
The customers arrive according to a Poisson process. We assume all customers and parts
are identical, and customers place orders one at a time. We further assume that the fixed
cost of sending an item to depot is negligible. For this reason, one-for-one replenishment is
appropriate.
If a customer is quoted lead-time d, then he places the order with probability f(d), where
f(d) is a decreasing function of d. We assume f(0) = 1 and that there exists a maximum
lead-time, dmax, where f(dmax) = 0. When an order is placed, it brings a revenue of R. The
service discipline is FCFS (first come first served). Customer interarrival and part repair
times are exponential with rate λ and µ, respectively. The repair service is capacitated,
with a single server. Unit time is defined as the expected service time, 1/µ, which without
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loss of generality we assume 1. The objective is to find the optimal base-stock level and the
optimal due date quoting policy. For this we consider a two stage solution methodology. In
the first stage we find the optimal due date quotation policy for a given base-stock level.
In the second stage we obtain insights on the optimal base-stock level.
4.3.1 The optimal due date quotation policy, given a base-stock level
The service center makes a decision each time a customer arrives to the system, i.e., stages
of the problem (or decision epochs) are determined by the customer arrivals, and the model
is formulated as a Semi-Markov Decision Process (SMDP).
The state and action spaces, reward function, and transition probabilities are defined in
Table 24. The state space is defined as I = {−s,−s + 1, .., 0, 1, ..∞}, where s is the base-
stock level. Negative states correspond to the number of parts waiting in the inventory,
and positive states correspond to the number of customers waiting in the queue. Note that
between two customer arrivals the state of the system may change several times, i.e., with
the arrival of parts from repair, the state may decrease. The action space is [0, dmax].
The reward function, ri(d), is the expected reward obtained from an arriving customer,
given the state is i upon arrival and the quoted due date is d. Reward consists of revenue,





+ (1− f(d))(−Ii) (26)
The expected lateness cost given the state is i upon arrival and the quoted due date is










−µx (Erlang(µ, j)) corresponds to the probability distribution func-
tion of the sum of j exponentially distributed variables, each with parameter µ. The lateness
cost per part per unit time is l. When i ≥ 0, if an arriving customer places an order, he
waits for the i parts in repair plus his own service time. When i < 0, a lateness cost is not
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Table 24: A glossary of notation for Chapter 4
s : base-stock level
i : index for the state, i ε I
d : due date quoted to a customer
dmax : upper bound on the due date quoted
d : due date policy, a vector of d values
f(d) : probability of placing an order if quoted due date is d
ri(d) : expected reward obtained when the due date quoted
to the arriving customer is d, given the state is i upon arrival
R : the revenue obtained when customer places an order
Li(d) : expected lateness cost when the due date quoted
to the arriving customer is d, given the state is i upon arrival
l : lateness cost per unit per unit time
Ii : expected inventory cost incurred until
next customer arrival, given the state is i upon arrival
h : holding cost per unit per unit time
P (j|i, d) : the probability that the next state is j, given the current state is i
and the arriving customer is quoted d
gd : the long-run average return per customer under due date policy d
g∗ : the long-run optimal average return per customer
gd(s) : the long-run return per unit time under due date policy d
and base-stock level s
g∗(s) corresponds to the return per unit time under
the optimal due date policy
g0(s) corresponds to the return per unit time under
the ’accept-all’ policy
v(i) : relative value of starting in state i
πi(d, s) : the steady-state probability of being in state i under due date policy d
and base-stock level s
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incurred since the demand is satisfied from inventory.
















where h is the holding cost per part per unit time. If i < 0, then there are -i parts
in inventory and s + i parts in repair. Until the next customer arrival, parts already in
inventory incur an expected inventory cost of h·(−i)λ . The parts in repair incur inventory
cost after they arrive. The expected waiting time of the jth part arriving from repair given
the next customer arrives at time t is
∫ t
0 (t−x)Ejdx. Therefore the j
th part in repair incurs




0 (t − x)Ejdxλe
−λtdt until the next customer arrival.
For i ≥ 0, no parts are waiting in inventory, but s+ i parts are in repair. Therefore for i ≥ 0
the first term is 0, and cost is possibly incurred for up to s parts until the next arrival.
The transaction probability function, P (j|i, d), is defined as the probability that the
next state is j, given the current state is i and the arriving customer is quoted d.
P (j|i, d) =






i−j+1 + (1− f(d))( µλ+µ)
i−j
)
, if i + 1 ≥ j > −s
f(d)( µµ+λ)
i+s+1 + (1− f(d))( µλ+µ)
i+s , if j = −s
(29)
Given state i, if the customer places an order, then there must be exactly i− j + 1 part
arrivals before the next customer arrival, for the next state to reach j > −s. We indicate
this probability with ( µµ+λ)
i−j+1 λ
µ+λ . If the customer does not place an order, then there
must be i − j part arrivals before the next customer arrival, for the state to reach j. On
the other hand, for j = −s, if the customer places an order, then there should be i + s + 1
part arrivals before the next customer arrival. Since i + s + 1 is the maximum number of
parts that can arrive, this probability is equivalent to the probability that there are more
than s + i part arrivals, as expressed below (say, for d = 0):
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The analysis is similar for j = −s when the customer does not place the order.
Choosing the optimal due dates upon customer arrivals is equivalent to choosing the
arrival rates at each state. Note that the problem under consideration is an M/M/1 queue
with the initial state -s. Proposition 5 shows that at optimality the system has finite number
of states (Proofs are presented in Appendix B).
Proposition 5 The problem under consideration has finite number of states at optimality.
In the remainder of this chapter, we make the analysis under finite state space, and we
simply indicate the final state as N . Next, we show that there exists a stationary optimal
policy.
Corollary 1 (Ross 1970, Corollary 6.20, p.149) If the state space is finite and every sta-
tionary policy gives rise to an irreducible Markov chain, then there exists an optimal station-
ary policy. Or if there exists a state, reachable from every other state under every stationary
policy, then there exists an optimal stationary policy.
Observation 13 In our problem, since the server is busy whenever there are parts in repair,
-s is reachable from every other state under every policy. Therefore there exists a single
communicating class and the optimal policy is a stationary policy.
Let gd be the long-run average return per customer under a stationary policy d. We
introduce the following definition.
Definition. (Tijms 1986, p.166) The relative value v(i) indicates the transient effect of
the initial state i on the total expected return under a given policy. Let V dn (i) be the total
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expected return after n stages (decision epochs) under policy d, with initial state i. Then
limn→∞V
d
n (i)/n = g
d. For n large, V dn (i) ≈ ngd + vd(i).
After defining the components, the SMDP is:
g∗ + v∗(i) = maxd{ri(d) +
∑
j
P (j|i, d)v∗(j)}, (30)
where, g∗ is the long-run optimal average return per customer, d is the due date
quoted to a customer (a scalar value), and v(i) is the relative value of starting in state i.
We use the notation g∗ and gd in Section 4.3.1, where we determine the optimal due date
quotation policy under an exogenous base-stock level. On the other hand, in Section 4.3.2,
where we study the optimal base-stock level, we use the notation gd(s), which corresponds
to the long-run return per unit time (see also Table 24). Note, gd(s) = λgd. Since λ is
a constant, the due date policy that results in optimal average return per customer is the
same as the policy that results in optimal return per unit time.
Next we characterize the optimal policy. Let d∗(s) be the optimal due date policy under
base-stock level s and d∗i (s) be the optimal due date quoted in state i (a scalar value). For
simplicity, we use d∗ instead of d∗(s).
We show in Proposition 6 below that whenever there are parts available in inventory,
the optimal policy is to quote 0.
Proposition 6 d∗i = 0 for i =-s, · · · ,−1.
Proof. First we show the optimal decision in state i < 0 is either to quote d = 0 (i.e,
accept the order with probability 1) or to quote d = dmax (i.e., reject). Suppose d is the
optimal decision in state i, where 0 < d < dmax. Then from (30),
v∗(i) = ri(d)− g∗ +
∑
j P (j|i, d)v∗(j) = maxd{ri(d)− g∗ +
∑





P (j|i, d)v∗(j) > ri(0) +
∑
j
P (j|i, 0)v∗(j). (31)
Note that, for i < 0, ri(d) and P (j|i, d) are convex combinations of ri(0) and ri(dmax),
and P (j|i, 0) and P (j|i, dmax), respectively. From Equation (31),
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f(d)P (j|i, 0) + (1− f(d))P (j|i, dmax)
)



















Since d is the optimal decision at state i, this is a contradiction. Therefore the optimal
decision in state i is either to accept or reject the order. Suppose −s ≤ k < 0 is the state
in which an arriving customer is rejected, i.e., for all i < k the customers are accepted. Let
us compare this policy (policy A) with a policy where the customers are accepted in k and
rejected in state k + 1 (policy B). Let πi and πi′ be the steady-state probabilities of being
in state i under policy A and policy B, respectively. An inventory cost of −i · h is incurred









i.e., the system spends less time in states i ≤ k under policy A than it does under policy
B. This implies under policy B, a lower long-run inventory cost is incurred per unit time.
Furthermore, since πk+1′ < πk, in steady-state a lower fraction of customers are rejected
under policy B, i.e., the long-run revenue per unit time is higher. As a result, under the
optimal policy, d∗i = 0 for i = −s, · · · ,−1.
Next, we show that for non-negative states, the optimal policy has a monotone structure,
i.e., as the number of customers in the system increases the quoted due date increases.
Let Ed(i, j) be the total expected profit and td(i, j) be the expected number of customers
that arrive to the system (but not necessarily place an order) between one visit from state
i to state j, under the stationary policy d.
Theorem 4 (Ross 1970, Theorem 7.5, p. 160) Suppose d is a stationary policy of the
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for all j (32)
If td(j, j) < ∞, then j is a positive recurrent state. In our problem, states −s, · · · ,−1, 0
are positive recurrent under optimality, since optimal decision is to quote 0 under states
−s, · · · ,−1. In general we can write the following for any policy d, a given positive recurrent
state j, and a starting state i (Tijms 1986):
vd(i) = Ed(i, j)− gd · td(i, j) (33)
Note that (32) and (33) imply vd(j) = 0. At optimality (under the optimal policy):
v∗(i) = E∗(i, j)− g∗ · t∗(i, j) ∀ i
where E∗(i, j) corresponds to the total expected return until first visit to j starting from
i under the optimal policy, t∗(i, j) corresponds to the expected number of customer arrivals
until first visit to j starting from i under the optimal policy, and v∗(i) corresponds to the
relative value of starting in state i under the optimal policy.
For any stationary policy d, g∗ > gd,
Ed(i, j)− g∗ · td(i, j) ≤ Ed(i, j)− gd · td(i, j) = vd(i) ≤ v∗(i)
From Equation (30), v(i) takes its maximum value under the optimal policy. Therefore,
Ed(i, j)− g∗ · td(i, j) ≤ vd(i) ≤ v∗(i)
and equality is obtained if Ed(i, j)− g∗ · td(i, j) is maximized over all d, ∀ i.
Now consider another SMDP problem. In this problem, the objective is to maximize
the total return until the system reaches state j starting from state i, where a constant
c is subtracted from the return at each customer arrival. Call this the modified problem.
The modified SMDP problem is different from the original SMDP problem in (30) in two
aspects:
1) The reward function of the original problem is ri(d), whereas the reward function of
the modified problem is ri(d)− c.
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2) (Under a stationary policy) In the original problem, state j is positive recurrent,
whereas in the modified problem, state j is absorbent. Therefore we can say that the
original problem is infinite-horizon, whereas the modified problem is finite-horizon.
If g∗ is used in place of the constant c in the modified problem, then the original and the
modified problem are equivalent in the sense that the optimal policies of the two problems
are the same. Maximizing Ed(i, j)− g∗ · td(i, j) over all d, gives the optimal policy for the
original problem, as we mentioned above. Also Ed(i, j)−g∗ ·td(i, j) is the expression for the
total expected return until reaching j starting from state i, with constant g∗ is subtracted
at each customer arrival. Maximizing this quantity over all d gives the optimal policy for
the modified problem (for a similar definition see Stidham and Weber 1989; Duenyas and
Hopp 1995).
We will determine whether the optimal policy of the modified problem is monotone for
non-negative states. Let E∗m(i, j) be the maximum total expected return starting from state
i until reaching j, of the modified problem. We set the constant c to g∗. E∗m(i, j) satisfies
the following optimality equation:
E∗m(i, j) = maxd





















for i ≥ −(s− 1)
(34)
For i = −s, we obtain E∗m(−s, j) as:




In (34), first observe that, 1λ+µ is the expected time for an event (a part or a customer
arrival) to occur. The system spends 1λ+µ amount of time in state i on expectation, and
during that period, the cost of being in state i is incurred. λλ+µ indicates the probability
that a customer arrival occurs before a part arrival. Since this is the modified problem,
whenever a customer arrives, g∗ is subtracted regardless of the customer’s decision. If a
customer places an order (with f(d)), the next state is (i + 1). If the customer does not
place an order (with 1− f(d)), the next state is i. Finally, µλ+µ indicates the probability a
part arrival occurs before a customer arrival. When a part arrives, the next state is (i− 1).
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Before showing the monotonicity of the optimal policy in Proposition 7, we introduce
the following lemmas.
Lemma 1 λ(d1)Li(d1)− λ(d2)Li(d2) is increasing in i, for d1 < d2, i ≥ 0.
Lemma 2 (Puterman 1994, Lemma 4.7.1) Suppose ε is a superadditive function on I ×D
and for each i ∈ I, max{d∈D} ε(i, d) exists. Then
f(i) = max{argmax{d∈D} ε(i, d)}
is monotone non-decreasing in i.
Lemma 3 E∗m(i, i− 1) is decreasing in i, for i > 0.
Proposition 7 The optimal policy of the modified problem is monotone increasing in i, for
i = 0, 1, · · · .
Proof. There are two steps that must be shown:
1) The due date policy d∗ that attains E∗m(i, j) is composed of d
∗




2) E∗m(i, i− 1) is superadditive.
1) In E∗m(i, j), let j = 0 (which is positive recurrent under optimal policy). We can
restrict our analysis to i ≥ 0, since we are interested in monotonicity of those states.
E∗m(i, 0) is as in (34). Let λ(d) = λf(d),














E∗m(i, 0) = maxd{
−λg∗ + λ(d)(R− Li(d) + E∗m(i + 1, 0))
λ + µ
+





E∗m(i, 0)(λ + µ) ≥− λg∗ + λ(d)(R− Li(d) + E∗m(i + 1, 0)) + (λ− λ(d))E∗m(i, 0)
+ µE∗m(i− 1, 0) ∀ d
E∗m(i, 0) ≥
−λg∗ + λ(d)(R− Li(d) + E∗m(i + 1, 0))− λ(d)E∗m(i, 0)
µ
+ E∗m(i− 1, 0) ∀ d,
E∗m(i, 0) = maxd{
−λg∗ + λ(d)(R− Li(d) + E∗m(i + 1, 0))− λ(d)E∗m(i, 0)
µ
}+ E∗m(i− 1, 0)
(35)
The system under consideration is skip-free in the negative (positive) direction, i.e, the
system cannot pass from state i to a lower (upper) state j < i (j > i) without passing
through all the intervening states (Keilson 1965). We use the skip-free negative property
to write:
E∗m(i, 0) = E
∗
m(i, i− 1) + E∗m(i− 1, 0).
(For a similar usage of skip-free property, see Wijngaard and Stidham 1986.)
Plugging E∗m(i + 1, i) + E
∗
m(i, 0) in place of E
∗
m(i + 1, 0) in (35),
E∗m(i, i− 1) = maxd{
−λg∗ + λ(d)(R− Li(d)) + λ(d)E∗m(i + 1, i)
µ
}. (36)
Therefore d∗ is composed of d∗i , where d
∗
i maximizes Em(i, i− 1).
2) We show d∗i is increasing in i. For this, it is sufficient to show that the term inside
parenthesis in (36), say ε(i, d), ε(i, d) = −λg
∗+λ(d)(R−Li(d))+λ(d)E∗m(i+1,i)
µ , is superadditive
(see Lemma 2). In other words, it is sufficient to show for any two scalars d1 and d2, such
that, d1 < d2, ε(i, d2)− ε(i, d1) is increasing in i, i > 0.
ε(i, d2)− ε(i, d1) = λ(d2)(R−Li(d2))−λ(d1)(R−Li(d1))µ +
(λ(d2)−λ(d1))E∗m(i+1,i)
µ
Note, the second term is increasing in i, since E∗m(i + 1, i) is decreasing in i (Lemma 3),
and λ(d2)− λ(d1) is negative. The first term is equal to,
R(λ(d2)− λ(d1)) + λ(d1)Li(d1)− λ(d2)Li(d2)
µ
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and λ(d1)Li(d1)− λ(d2)Li(d2) is increasing in i (Lemma 1). As a result ε(i, d) is super-
additive for i ≥ 0.
We conclude that, the optimal policy for the original and the modified problem is mono-
tone increasing for states i ≥ 0.
Theorem 5 The optimal policy d∗ of the problem in (30) is characterized as, d∗i = 0 for
i < 0 and d∗i increasing in i for i ≥ 0.
Proof. From Propositions 6 and 7.
4.3.2 The optimal base-stock level, s∗
In this section we obtain insights on the optimal base-stock level, s∗. Let us first write the
return per unit time under due date policy d and base-stock level s:








Consider a newsboy problem where the overage cost is h, underage cost is l, the order
quantity is s, and the demand has a discrete nature with probability distribution P (D =




(s− i) · πi−s(d, s) + l
∞∑
i=s+1
(i− s) · πi−s(d, s). (37)
Now, consider a system where the due date policy is to quote 0 at every state, which
we call as accept-all policy. This system has infinite number of states. Whenever i < 0, the
cost incurred is i · h per unit time, and whenever i > 0, the cost incurred is i · l per unit
time 2. We denote the return per unit time under the accept-all policy by g0(s):
g0(s) = λR− h
−1∑
i=−s
(−i) · πi(0, s)− l
∞∑
i=1
i · πi(0, s) (38)
where πi(0, s) = (1− λ)λi+s.
2The reason is, when the due date quoted is 0 at every state, existence of a customer implies a lateness
cost is incurred (similar to existence of a part implies an inventory cost is incurred). On the other hand, if
a customer is quoted a due date d > 0, then the service center does not incur a lateness cost due to this
customer for the first d time units after the arrival. In that case even if there are i customers in the system,
lateness cost per unit time would be less than i · l.
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Let us consider the corresponding newsboy problem with demand probability distribu-
tion equivalent to the steady-state probability obtained under the accept-all policy. We




(s− i) · πi−s(0, s) + l
∞∑
i=s+1
(i− s) · πi−s(0, s). (39)
From (38) and (39), cost(g0(s)) is identical to the cost incurred in the newsboy problem,
N0(s). Therefore the optimal base-stock quantity of the due date problem under accept-all
policy, say s1, is equal to the optimal order quantity of the newsboy problem. Note that,
under accept-all policy the revenue in the due date problem, λR, is a constant and hence
does not have any affect on the optimal base-stock level.
Example 4. Consider a system where h = 2/part/unit time, l = 7/customer/unit time,
λ = 0.7/unit time and µ = 1/unit time. ρ = λµ = 0.7.
P (x) = π(−s+x) = (1− ρ)ρx
Define the cumulative distribution function of the demand as F (x) = P (D ≤ x). Then
F (s1) = 77+2 = 0.778
Table 25: Cumulative distribution function for Example 4







We take the smallest x value where F (x) ≥ ll+h . In this example s1 is 4, and we obtain,
N0(4) = 8.375.
Next, we show that s1 is an upper bound on the optimal base-stock level of the due
date problem, s∗. Let d∗(s∗) be the optimal due date policy with base-stock level s∗. For
simplicity we indicate this only with d∗. We show s∗ ≤ s1 in two steps: (i) given a parameter
set, Nd
∗
(s) has an optimal order quantity s̄ ≥ s∗, (ii) s1 ≥ s̄.
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Proposition 8 s̄ ≥ s∗.
Proof. Consider Nd
∗
(s). We show that ordering a quantity of s∗ results in lower cost
than ordering s∗ − 1, i.e., Nd∗(s∗) < Nd∗(s∗ − 1). Since for a given policy d, Nd(s) is
convex in s, this implies s̄ ≥ s∗ (for convexity of the cost with respect to s under the
newsboy problem, see Nahmias 1997).
First we show that the following inequality,
Nd(s)− cost(gd(s)) < Nd(s− 1)− cost(gd(s− 1)) (40)
holds under a base-stock s and a due date policy d, where d corresponds to a policy
with first s states quoted 0. That is, if policy d is employed under base-stock s, then due
date quoted is 0 for i = −s,−(s− 1), · · · ,−1, and if policy d is employed under base-stock
s − 1, then due date quoted is 0 for i = −(s + 1), · · · ,−1, 0. Furthermore di is quoted in
state i under base-stock s and in state i + 1 under base-stock s− 1, i = −s,−(s− 1), · · · .








πi(d, s) · (−i) + l
N∑
i=0




πi(d, s) · (−i)− λl
N∑
i=0
πi(d, s) · f(di) · Li(di)
Note, the inventory cost incurred per unit time is the same for both problems. Only the
lateness cost differs.
Nd(s)− cost(gd(s)) = λl
N∑
i=0
πi(d, s) · f(0) · Li(0)− λl
N∑
i=0




πi(d, s) · [f(0) · Li(0)− f(di) · Li(di)]
(41)
Nd(s− 1) and cost(gd(s− 1)) are the costs obtained under due date policy d and base-
stock s− 1. Since di is quoted in state i + 1, πi(d, s) = πi+1(d, s− 1), for i = −s, · · · , N .
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Nd(s− 1)− cost(gd(s− 1)) =λl
N+1∑
i=0




πi(d, s− 1) · f(di−1) · Li(di−1)












πi(d, s) · [f(0) · Li+1(0)− f(di) · Li+1(di)]
(42)
Note the relation between (41) and (42). Since f(0) · Li(0) − f(di) · Li(di) < f(0) ·
Li+1(0)− f(di) · Li+1(di) (by Lemma 1), we conclude that,
Nd(s)− cost(gd(s)) < Nd(s− 1)− cost(gd(s− 1))
cost(gd(s− 1))− cost(gd(s)) < Nd(s− 1)−Nd(s)
Next, we need to show, 0 <cost(gd(s−1))−cost(gd(s)), for s = s∗ and d = d∗. Note that






(s∗ − 1) (43)
since gd
∗





(s∗ − 1). Therefore s̄ can not be less than s∗.
To show s1 ≥ s̄, we introduce the following lemma.
Lemma 4 Consider two birth-death processes with the same state space S = {0, 1, · · · }.
Let the transition intensity from state i− 1 to i be λi ≥ 0, and the transition intensity from
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state i to i − 1 be µi > 0, for i = 1, 2, · · · . Define ρji (=
λji
µji
), for i = 1, 2, · · · and j = 1, 2.






π2i n = 0, 1, · · · < ∞,
where πji denotes the steady-state probability of state i of process j.
Proposition 9 s1 ≥ s̄
Proof. Consider the two newsboy problems N0(s1) and Nd
∗
(s̄). Let π1 and π2 be the
demand probability functions of N0(s1) and Nd
∗
(s̄), respectively.







































4.4 Comparison of Hybrid and Make-to-Order Systems
An interesting question that arises is whether keeping inventory is more beneficial than
operating in a pure make-to-order environment. In this section we conduct experiments to
make a comparison of two systems: (i) a hybrid system where (optimal) inventory is kept,
and (ii) a make-to-order (MTO) system where all orders are back-ordered. We observe the
conditions under which keeping inventory is preferable, and analyze how the benefits change
with respect to the system parameters.
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Intuitively, one might think that it would be profitable to keep inventory when revenue
per customer, R, is high. This would allow the manufacturer to meet as many customers
as possible without losing any portion of the revenue. However this is may not always be
the case. Specifically, if λ ≤ hh+l , then operating in a MTO environment is more beneficial
regardless of the R value. Note, when λ ≤ hh+l , the upper bound on the optimal inventory
level is zero, s1 = 0. This implies, if the customer arrival rate is low (that is, if inventory is
to be kept over long periods), or if holding cost, h, is high with respect to lateness cost, l,
then keeping inventory is more likely to lower the profits.
Before starting the experimental analysis, we present the following proposition on oper-
ating under the MTO system versus under a hybrid system.
Figure 12: R∗ value under varying conditions (l = 1.5)
Proposition 10 Keeping inventory is more profitable than operating under MTO system,
if λ > hh+l and revenue per customer is greater than R
∗, where R∗ is the threshold value
at which the retailer is indifferent between keeping an inventory level of 1 and keeping no
inventory.
We derive R∗ in Appendix B.5. Figure 12 shows the threshold values for different levels
of holding cost and customer arrival rates (where lateness cost is constant).
For the experimental analysis, we consider 3 factors that affect the system behavior: (i)
revenue per customer, R, (ii) holding cost per unit per unit time, h, and (iii) arrival rate,
λ. In the experiments lateness cost per unit per unit time is hold constant.
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We perform the experiments for different levels of each factor. For R, h, and λ we
test 7 levels each, R = {5, 7.5, 10, 15, 25, 50, 100}, h = {0.15, 0.3, 0.6, 0.9, 1.2, 1.5, 1.8} and
λ = {0.15, 0.3, 0.45, 0.6, 0.75, 0.9, 0.99}. We assume dmax = 4, and the probability of placing
an order is f(d) = 1− ( ddmax )
1
4 , which is a convex function of d. f(d) being convex implies
customers are more sensitive to the changes in due dates when the duration of due date
quoted is short. We discretize the action space as 0, 0.5, 1, · · · , 4. In practice firms quote
discrete due dates rather than continuous ones. Our comparison of this ’incremental’ due
date policy with an accept-reject policy (where the action set is {0, 4}) indicates the profit
loss due to narrowing the action space, is very small. The highest relative decrease is when
R = 5 and the % difference is at most 5% this case, with a scalar value of 0.118 (see Figure
13).
Figure 13: % difference in profits under incremental versus accept-reject policies
We assume l = 1.5. Note that if R, h and l are decreased or increased in the same
proportion, profit also changes in the same proportion, whereas the optimal base-stock level
and due date policy do not change. Therefore by setting l = 1.5 we consider the following
ratios; R/l = {3.33, 5, 6.67, 10, 16.67, 33.33, 66.67}, and h/l = {0.1, 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8, 1, 1.2}.
The “hybrid system” has optimal base-stock level, s∗, and the “MTO system” has base-
stock level 0. We always consider the optimal due date policy unless otherwise stated. Note
the profit under the hybrid system is always greater than or equal to the profit under the
MTO system. We could not obtain the optimal base-stock level (for a given parameter set)
in closed-form. Therefore we make an exhaustive enumerative search of possible base-stock
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levels. In section 4.3.2 we determined s1 as an upper bound on the optimal base-stock level.
Proposition 11 states that a tighter upper bound may exist.
Proposition 11 The optimal base-stock level under the accept-reject policy is an upper
bound on the optimal base-stock level under the incremental policy.
The optimal base-stock levels under the incremental and accept-reject policy types when
R = 7.5 is given in Table 26. Note that the two policy types result in the same optimal
base-stock level for all settings under R = 7.5, except when h = 0.3 and λ = 0.6. This
implies under the current experimental settings, accept-reject policy provides a pretty tight
upper bound.
Table 26: Optimal base-stock levels under the incremental policy (left column) and the
accept-reject policy (right column) for R = 7.5
λ \ h 0.15 0.3 0.6 0.9 1.2 1.5 1.8
0.15 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.3 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.45 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.6 4 4 2 3 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
0.75 5 5 4 4 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1
0.9 7 7 5 5 3 3 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1
0.99 9 9 6 6 4 4 3 3 2 2 2 2 1 1
To find the optimal base-stock level under the accept-reject policy an exhaustive search
between 0 and s1 is conducted.
The following performance measures are used in the analysis of experimental results:
1. Long-run average profit per customer:











2. Long-run profit per unit time:









3. Expected number of customers in the system:
∑N
1 πi(d) · i
Based on the experimental results, we make the following observations and provide some
intuition to the dynamics behind each one.
Observation 14 (a) In a MTO environment the average profit per customer decreases as
λ increases.
(b) For a given R, as λ increases and h decreases, the % difference in average profit per
customer between an hybrid system and a MTO system increases. (Figure 15.a)
(c) For a given λ, as R and h decreases, the % difference in average profit between a
hybrid system and a MTO system increases. (Figure 15.b)
Figure 14: Optimal base-stock level with respect to h and λ
Figure 15: Change in average profit as R or λ changes
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(a) Under MTO, since there does not exist any inventory, profit consists of revenue and
lateness cost. As arrival rate increases, expected waiting time per customer increases. This
causes either an increase in lateness cost per customer or (with an effort to avoid lateness
cost) a decrease revenue per customer. This implies average profit per customer decreases
as the customer arrival rate increases.
(b) The optimal basestock level increases as λ increases and h decreases (Figure 14).
In other words, the hybrid system can make use of high customer arrival rates and low
holding cost by increasing the base-stock level accordingly. As a result, the % difference in
average profit between an hybrid system and a MTO system increases as λ increases and h
decreases (Figure 15.a).
(c) The scalar difference in average profits obtained under the hybrid and MTO systems
does not change very much with R. For instance for λ = 0.3 and h = 0.15, the hybrid
system increases the profits by 1.13 under R = 7.5, and by 1.15 under R = 50. Similarly,
when λ = 0.45 and h = 0.6, the hybrid system increases the profits by 0.7579 under R = 15
and by 0.7667 under R = 100. This implies the impact of keeping inventory on average
profits is more under low R (Figure 15.b).
Observation 15 The profit per unit time under the hybrid system increases with λ (Figure
16). When λ is sufficiently large, the increase has diminishing returns.
An increase in customer arrival rate increases the profit per unit time, since at optimality
it is always possible to reject a customer if accepting the customer decrease the profits. On
the other hand, for instance under an accept-all policy, the profit per unit time is likely to
decrease with increasing λ (Consider the case where, h = 2, l = 7, and R = 50. Under
λ = 0.95, the profit per unit time is 18.89, and under λ = 0.99, −94.79). Under the optimal
policy, the benefits from an increase in customer arrival rate decreases under high arrival
rates (Figure 16).
Under high customer arrival rates, intuitively, it would be harder to meet customer
demand on-time and an increasing number of customers would be rejected. This implies
the average profit per unit customer decreases under high customer arrival rate.
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Figure 16: Average profit per customer and profit per unit time under the optimal base-
stock level, as a function of λ
Observation 16 The expected number of customers under the MTO system is greater than
or equal to the expected number of customers under the hybrid system.
Figure 17: Expected number of customers as a function of λ
Since no inventory is kept under the MTO system, the expected number of customers
is always high as compared to the hybrid system. We observe from Figure 17 that the
difference in expected number of customers under the two systems is high especially under
high R, high λ and low h.
4.5 Concluding Remarks
We considered a manufacturer’s dynamic due date quotation problem with an option of
keeping base-stock. We found that when there are parts in inventory, the optimal decision
is to meet the demand immediately. If there are no parts available, then the optimal due
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date quoted has a monotone increasing structure with respect to the number of customers
in the system. To find the optimal base-stock level, first we determined a general upper
bound that applies for any policy type (such as accept-reject, incremental or continuous).
We further obtained that the optimal base-stock level under the accept-reject policy is an
upper bound on the optimal due date policy under the incremental policy.
In this problem setting we studied whether it is more beneficial to operate under a
MTO environment or under a hybrid environment where initial inventory is kept. Analysis
indicated that although high R is an incentive to keep initial inventory, if the customer
arrival rate is less than a threshold level, then operating under MTO is more beneficial
than keeping initial inventory regardless of how high R is. Our comparison of the two
systems indicates that the relative benefits of keeping inventory is high if holding cost is
low, customer arrival rate is high, and revenue per customer is low. The profit per unit time
increases as utilization increases and the increase has diminishing returns when customer
arrival rate is high. High utilization levels lead to higher number of customers in the system




In this thesis we analyzed horizontal collaborative efforts among supply chain participants
in the procurement process and the challenges that are faced by the suppliers in meeting
demand. We analyzed horizontal collaboration among buyers in two different settings. In
the first setting we considered a market where buyers and suppliers make transactions over
multiple items in multiple units (Chapter 2). Buyers are composed of buyer divisions each
responsible for a single item. The divisions are located in the same region which enables
them to aggregate their demand and obtain savings on the fixed cost of transportation.
Similarly, buyer divisions of different buyers that procure the same item may aggregate
their demand and share the fixed cost of production charged by the supplier. We com-
pared three models with increasing levels of collaboration: (i) no collaboration; (ii) internal
collaboration; and (iii) full collaboration. We tested these models under different market
conditions determined by the supply level in the system, fixed cost of transportation and
fixed cost of production. The experimental results indicate that when the fixed cost of
transportation are high, internal collaboration, which takes place only among the buyer
divisions of a single buyer, benefits the buyers. On the other hand, when also fixed cost of
production are high and there exists low supply in the system as compared to demand, full
collaboration provides the highest benefits.
We would like to briefly discuss how our assumptions of “the buyer divisions being
located in the same region” and “each buyer division being responsible for the procurement
of one item” affect the results obtained. If these two assumptions are relaxed, the structure
of the model and the form of collaboration would change. In this case divisions that belong
to different buyers located in the same region could achieve savings from transportation
(economies of scope), whereas buyer divisions of the same buyer located at different regions
could achieve savings from production by leveraging their purchasing power economies of
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scale). This could lead to a conclusion that internal collaboration is beneficial when benefits
from economies of scale are high. However, full collaboration would still be most beneficial
when savings both from the fixed costs of production and transportation are high.
In these collaborative environments, the central mechanism which enables full collab-
oration (in our study, an e-market intermediary) should understand the implications of
antitrust laws. Collaboration in the e-market might give incentives to the participants to
collude in the upstream or downstream marketplaces. Therefore intermediaries should keep
sensitive information such as output levels, reservation prices, costs or capacity levels, con-
fidential. The total profit obtained under full collaboration provides an upper bound on
the profit that would be obtained under less collaborative environments. Thus even if full
collaboration is not possible due to antitrust laws or other reasons, the upper bound would
provide value information for the intermediary and the participants.
Our results from Chapter 2 suggest that when buyers have roughly equal procurement
quantities and compete in different end markets, collaboration is always beneficial for the
buyers. To understand the impact of competition on the benefits of collaboration, in Chap-
ter 3 we consider competing buyers, who may procure different quantities due to their own
capacity restrictions.
In Chapter 3 we model a supply chain with two buyers and one supplier where buyers
collaborate and obtain quantity discounts from the supplier and then engage in a Cournot
competition in a secondary (production) market. The buyers decide how many units to
procure/sell, and given a discount schedule, whether or not to participate in collaborative
procurement. The supplier chooses the amount of the quantity discount. We consider two
cases depending on the buyers’ procurement capacities. In the first case buyers do not
have any limitations on procurement quantities. We find that buyers are always willing
to collaborate in this case. In the second case we consider capacitated buyers. We find
that a buyer is willing to collaborate if he can increase his procurement quantity under
collaboration. Furthermore, we observe that buyers of different size may be willing to
collaborate, whereas roughly equally sized buyers may not always benefit from collaboration.
When buyers have different sizes, the buyer with higher buying power has more impact on
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the collaboration process, in the sense that, when collaboration does not take place, it is
either due to this buyer or due to the supplier. Finally, since the buyers’ procurement
quantities increase under collaboration, the price in the secondary market decreases and
end consumers are better off.
The model we studied in Chapter 3 is a single-period model. Although such a model has
limitations compared to a multi-period model which considers collaboration among buyers
over multiple periods, it provides useful insights and is relatively easier to analyze. In our
model, buyers do not have to be engaged in a long-term contract with each other or with
suppliers to obtain discounts. This model would be applicable, for example, if collaborative
purchasing is achieved through a group purchasing organization (GPO), where each buyer
signs a contract with the GPO but not necessarily with each other. For example, in Nistevo
shippers form groups to share space provided by the carriers and such environments may
be represented by a single-period model (although in some cases replication might exist).
Another limitation of our model is the assumption that all parameters such as buyer
capacities are known to the participants. In our model, the “buyer” could be a manufacturer.
In practice manufacturers have capacity restrictions and it is not difficult to know such
physical restrictions. For example, if the buyer is a paper manufacturer, the information
on the number of paper machines in a mill and their capacities can be obtained easily.
Furthermore, as the buyers join the group purchasing agreement, they usually specify a
range for the minimum and maximum amounts they would like to procure, which could be
interpreted as capacity.
Finally, many of our results in Chapter 3 depend on the assumption of linear demand
curve and the supply cost function. Although both the linear demand and the supply cost
function are used in the literature (see Albaek 1990; D’Aspremont and Jacquemin 1988),
obtaining insights on more general demand and supply curves would be quite interesting.
Analysis of a relatively general demand and supply function is under way.
In a recent survey conducted among 500 manufacturers, 83% of the respondents ranked
the ability to meet delivery schedules as the most important criterion for selecting a vendor
(Keeping 2002). After studying the buyers’ collaborative efforts to lower the procurement
84
costs, in the second part of the thesis we considered the supplier’s problem of reliability and
responsiveness in meeting demand (Chapter 4).
We considered the supplier’s due date quotation decisions based on customers’ sensitivity
to lead-times, workload status in the system and the long-run affects of accepting a customer
on system congestion. As a means to increase responsiveness the supplier considers keeping
inventory. In this setting we characterized the supplier’s due date decisions and optimal
inventory level. Our analysis indicated that meeting demand immediately when there are
parts available in stock is the optimal decision. This is intuitive due to the assumption of
identical parts. If there are no parts available in stock then the supplier’s optimal quoted
due date increases as the number of customers in the system increases. To find the optimal
base-stock level we conducted enumeration over all possible base-stock levels staring from
an upper bound to 0.
After the analysis of the optimal due date policy and base-stock level, we addressed
the question whether it is more beneficial to keep inventory or to operate under a make-
to-order (MTO) system. The experimental results indicate that when the arrival rate is
below or holding cost is above a certain threshold, it is always better to operate under MTO
regardless of how high the revenue is. In other cases, benefits of keeping inventory increase
under high revenue, high arrival rate and low holding cost.
Our model in Chapter 4 assumes a single part (customer) type and Poisson arrivals
and departures. These assumptions can be relaxed in several directions. For instance, the
firm may have different customer classes each with different revenues. Furthermore, the
firm may have several processing options such as regular processing versus expediting, each
with different costs. These variations would affect the optimal base-stock and due date
quotation policies; in particular, the firm would benefit from reserving some parts for high-




ADDENDUM FOR CHAPTER 3
A.1 Assumption A3
We show that for buyer i, given qj , the total procurement cost is increasing in qi ∈ [0, ri(qj)]
(we assume qi is bounded above, since from (25), qi ≤ ri(qj)).
SJi (qi, qj)qi = (c1 − c2(qi + βqj))qi
Taking derivative with respect to qi, we obtain:
∂SJi qi
∂qi
= c1 − 2c2qi − βc2qj
i) Given qj < q̄,
∂SJi qi
∂qi
attains its minimum at ri(qj), which is the maximum value of qi
(both when buyer i is uncapacitated or capacitated) :
∂SJi qi
∂qi
= c1 − 2c2 a−c1−(b−βc2)qj2(b−c2) − βc2qj
= c1b−ac2+bc2qj(1−β)b−c2




ii) Given qj ≥ q̄, qi = 0, which implies SJi qi = 0.
A.2 Proposition 1




U ) over setting β < β
c
and selling (0, qM ) (or (qM , 0)). For β∗U = 1 (β
∗ ≥ 1) or βc < 0 (b > 2c2), there exists a
single equilibrium.
1) For β∗U = β
∗, we show that πS(q∗U , q
∗




? πS(qM , 0)
2(c1 − c2q∗U (1 + β∗))q∗U >? (c1 − c2qM )qM






3y − (2 + β∗)
(1− x− 1
3y − (2 + β∗)






Plugging in 3y(2−x)−2x in place of β
∗ we obtain the following:
2x2
(3y − 1)(x− 1)
>?
(2y − x− 1)
(y − 1)2
Since by assumption A1, x > 1 and y > 1, the denominators of both sides are positive
and the inequality is equivalent to:
2x2(y − 1)2 − (2y − x− 1)(3y − 1)(x− 1) >? 0
Rearranging the terms,
(
2(y − 1)2 + (3y − 1)
)
x2 − 2y(3y − 1)x + (2y − 1)(3y − 1) >? 0 (46)
Note that since 0 < βc = 2− bc2 = 2−y, we have y < 2. For 1 < y < 2, the left hand side
(LHS) of (46) does not have any real roots, and LHS is positive. Therefore the inequality
holds for 1 < y < 2.




U ) to setting β < β
c
and selling (qM , 0).




U ) ≥ πS(qM , 0). β∗U = 0 implies x > 2−
2
3y .
Assumption A3 states x < y. This implies, for β∗ < 0 to hold, 2− 23y < y, or equivalently
3y2 − 6y + 2 > 0 should hold. 3y2 − 6y + 2 takes negative values for y ∈ [1 − 1√
3
, 1 + 1√
3
].
Since y > 1, y > 1 + 1√
3
is a necessary condition for β∗ < 0. Furthermore since we consider
0 < βc, we assume y < 2.
Now let us check whether πS(qIU , q
I
U ) > πS(qM , 0) holds under 1 +
1√
3




? πS(qM , 0)
2qIU (c1 − c2qIU ) >? qM (c1 − c2qM )
2(3y − x− 1)






which is equivalent to,
f(x, y) = 2(3y − x− 1)(2y − 2)2 − (2y − x− 1)(3y − 2)2 >? 0 (47)
f(x, y) is linear and increasing in x (since ∂f∂x = y
2 + 4y− 4 > 0 for 1 + 1√
3
< y < 2) and




Therefore, if we show that x always takes greater values than this quantity, we show




Note that RHS is decreasing in y for y ∈ [1+ 1√
3
, 2]. Therefore an upper bound on RHS
is 1.28 which is attained at y = 1 + 1√
3
. On the other hand, LHS is increasing in y and a
lower bound on LHS is 1 + 1√
3
> 1.28, which is attained at y = 1 + 1√
3
. We conclude that
for y ∈ [1 + 1√
3
, 2],
x > 2− 23y >
6y3−23y2+20y−4
y2−4y+4
Hence, when β∗ < 0, πS(qIU , q
I






A.3 Theorems 1 and 2
Proof of Theorem 1
(K2 < qU )
β > βc: Note in this case, qM < q̄, qj < q̄, therefore ri(qj) > 0. From Equation (25),
qi ≤ ri(qj), i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j for all equilibria (q1, q2).
For 0 ≤ q2 < qU , q2 < r2(r1(q2)). This implies q2 < r2(min{r1(q2),K1}), i.e., q2 <
r2(q1). In that case, since q2 =min{K2, r2(q1)} from (25), q2 = K2. q1 =min{r1(K2),K1}.
β < βc: Note in this case, qM > q̄. q1 can be greater or less than q̄. q2 ≤ r2(q1) holds
only for q1 ≤ q̄.
Suppose q1 ≥ q̄: The only possible equilibrium quantity for firm 2 is: q2 = 0. Therefore
q1 = K1, q2 = 0 are the equilibrium quantities for the two firms. This case is possible if
and only if K1 ≥ q̄.
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Suppose q1 ≤ q̄: For 0 ≤ q2 < qU , q2 > r2(r1(q2)) (since β < βc). We also know from
(25) that q2 ≤ r2(q1), therefore q1 6= r1(q2), i.e., q1 = K1. In this case q2 =min{K2, r2(K1)}.
Note, since we consider the case where K1 ≤ q̄, r2(K1) ≥ 0.
Therefore the equilibrium under β < βc is (K1,min{K2, r2(K1)+}).
Proof of Theorem 2.
(qU ≤ K2 < qM )
Since r2(r1(qU )) = qU , and min{qU ,Ki} = qU , Equation (25) implies (qU , qU ) is an
equilibrium. Let us check whether there exist other equilibria.
β > βc: Note in this case, qM < q̄, qj < q̄, therefore ri(qj) > 0. From Equation (25),
qi ≤ ri(qj), i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j for all equilibria (q1, q2).
We divide the equilibrium region into two: 0 ≤ q2 < qU and qU < q2, and check whether
there exists any equilibrium in either region.
(i) If 0 ≤ q2 < qU , then q2 < r2(r1(q2)). This implies q2 < r2(min{r1(q2),K1}), i.e.,
q2 < r2(q1). In that case, since q2 =min{K2, r2(q1)} from (25), q2 = K2. This is a
contradiction since q2 < qU .
(ii) If qU < q2, then q2 > r2(r1(q2)). Since by (25) q2 ≤ r2(q1), we conclude that
q1 6= r1(q2), i.e., q1 = K1. But this is not possible since, if qU < q2, then r1(q2) < qU , i.e.,
q1 < qU .
There do not exist any other equilibria under β > βc case.
β < βc: Note in this case, qM > q̄. qi can be greater or less than q̄. qj ≤ rj(qi) holds
only for qi ≤ q̄.
Suppose q1 ≥ q̄: The only possible equilibrium quantity for firm 2 is: q2 = 0. Therefore
q1 = K1, q2 = 0 are the equilibrium quantities for the two firms. This case is possible if
and only if Ki ≥ q̄.
Suppose q1 ≤ q̄:
(i) If 0 ≤ q2 < qU , then q2 > r2(r1(q2)) (since β < βc). We also know from (25) that
q2 ≤ r2(q1), therefore q1 6= r1(q2), i.e., q1 = K1. In this case q2 =min{r2(K1),K2} = r2(K1).
Note, since we consider the case where K1 ≤ q̄, r2(K1) ≥ 0.
(ii) If qU < q2, then q2 < r2(r1(q2)). This implies q2 < r2(min{r1(q2),K1}), i.e.,
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q2 < r2(q1). The only possible equilibrium quantity for firm 2 is K2. In this case equilibrium
quantity for firm 1 is q1 =min{K1, r1(K2)} = r1(K2).
Therefore there exist two additional equilibria under β < βc case, (K1, r2(K1)+) and
(r1(K2)+,K2).
A.4 Analysis of Figure 7 and Figure 8
We analyze Case 5 of Figure 7 and Case 18 of Figure 8. Analysis for other cases is similar.
For Case 5, since b < 2c2, the system is in Case B when β = 0 and in Case A when β = 1.
K1 <
a−c1
b , therefore r2(K1) > 0, i.e., the quantity procured by buyer 2 is positive for all
β ∈ [0, 1]. qM − b2(b−c2)K1 ≤ K2 implies, under independent procurement r2(K1) < K2, i.e,
initially the equilibrium is at E3. K2 < qM − K1 implies β31 < βc. Depending on β the
system is at E3 or E1.






+ 1qM implies β2 ≤ β43 and the equilibrium switches from E2 to E4 at β = β2 and from
E4 to E3 at β43. Since K2 ≥ qM − K1, β31 > βc and at βc the equilibrium switches from
E3 to E5. K2 ≤ 2(qM −K1) implies β51 < 1, at which the equilibrium switches from E5 to
E1. Depending on β the system is at E2, E4, E3, E5 or E1.
A.5 Proposition 2
Let qIi and q
J
i denote the equilibrium quantities under independent and joint procurement,
respectively. We introduce the following lemma.
Lemma 5 If MRJi −MCJi ≥ MRIi −MCIi and qJi ≥ qIi , buyer i is better off or no worse
off, and if MRJi −MCJi ≤ MRIi −MCIi and qJi ≤ qIi , buyer i is worse off or no better off
under joint procurement as compared to independent procurement.
Proof (Lemma 5). If MRJi −MCJi ≥ MRIi −MCIi and qJi ≥ qIi , then πJi ≥ πIi :
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MRJi −MCJi ≥ MRIi −MCIi(




a− b(2qIi + qIj )− c1 + c2(2qIi )
)
qIi
πJi − qJi 2(b− c2) ≥ πIi − qIi 2(b− c2)
πJi − πIi ≥ (b− c2)(qJi 2 − qIi 2)
(48)
Last inequality of (48) implies, if MRJi − MCJi ≥ MRIi − MCIi and qJi ≥ qIi , then
πJi ≥ πIi .
We show that for all of the cases in Figures 7 and 8, and for all β ∈ (0, 1], either
MRJi −MCJi ≥ MRIi −MCIi and qJi ≥ qIi , or MRJi −MCJi ≤ MRIi −MCIi and qJi ≤ qIi ,
i = 1, 2. We identify the β values (if any), under which MRJi −MCJi ≥ MRIi −MCIi and
qJi ≥ qIi .
Note, when β increases, MC decreases, i.e., MR − MC increases for both buyers (as-
suming the quantities remain the same). Furthermore, if at equilibrium buyer i procures
at capacity, qi = Ki, then MRi ≥ MCi; if he procures less than capacity, qi = ri(qj), then
MRi = MCi, and if he does not procure, qi = 0, then MRi ≤ MCi.
(1) When buyer 2 has tight capacity, the system can be in one of the four equilibria (E1,
E3, E4, E5) under independent procurement. Depending on the initial equilibrium and β,
the system can be in one of the four equilibria (E1, E3, E4, E5) under joint procurement
(see Figure 7). For each initial equilibrium, we explain if and when the buyers are better
off under joint procurement:
(i) E1: For all β ∈ (0, 1], the equilibrium is E1, i.e., (qJ1 , qJ2 ) = (K1,K2). MRJi −MCJi >
MRIi −MCIi and qIi = qJi , i = 1, 2. Buyers are better off under joint procurement.
(ii) E5: For buyer 1, under independent procurement MRI1 = MC
I
1 . For β ∈ (0, β51],
the equilibrium is E5, and for β ∈ [β51, 1] the equilibrium is E1. Under both E1 and E5 (for
β ∈ (0, 1]), the quantity of buyer 1 increases, qJ1 > qI1 , and MRJ1−MCJ1 ≥ MRI1−MCI1 = 0,
therefore buyer 1 is better off. For buyer 2, under independent procurement MRI2 > MC
I
2 .
The equilibrium quantity under joint procurement is the same, qI2 = q
J
2 = K2. If equilibrium
under joint procurement is E5,




In this case buyer 2 is better off. If equilibrium under joint procurement is E1,
(MRJ2 −MCJ2 )− (MRI2 −MCI2 ) = b · a−c1−bK22(b−c2) − (b− βc2)K1 > 0 (since K1 < r1(K2)),
which implies buyer 2 is better off under joint procurement.
(iii) E3: Under joint procurement the equilibrium is either E3, E5 or E1. This implies
for β ∈ (0, 1], qJ2 > qI2 and MRJ2 −MCJ2 ≥ MRI2−MCI2 = 0, therefore buyer 2 is better off.
Whether buyer 1 is better or worse off depends on the equilibrium under joint procurement.
If under joint procurement the equilibrium is:




1 −MCJ1 ) − (MRI1 −MCI1 ) =
βc2
2(b−c2)(a − c1 − (2b −
βc2)K1) < 0. Buyer 1 is worse off.
(b) E5, then qJ1 < q
I
1 and 0 = MR
J
1 −MCJ1 < MRI1 −MCI1 . Buyer 1 is worse off.




1 −MCJ1 )− (MRI1 −MCJ1 ) = b · r2(K1)− (b− βc2) ·K2.
Since qI1 = q
J
1 , β determines whether buyer 1 is better or worse off. For β > β
′ where
β′ = bc2 (1−
r2(K1)
K2
), MRJ1 −MCJ1 > MRI1 −MCI1 , therefore buyer 1 is better off, whereas
for β < β′, buyer 1 is worse off under joint procurement. Note r2(K1) corresponds to the
procurement quantity of buyer 2 under independent procurement, whereas K2 is his the
procurement quantity under joint procurement.
Note, when β > β′, equilibrium can not be E5 or E3, the system can only be in E1. To
see why, suppose β > β′ and the equilibrium is E5. This implies β′ < β51. β > β′ implies
(MRJ1 − MCJ1 ) − (MRI1 − MCI1 ) > 0 when q1 = K1 and q2 = K2. However at β51 > β′,
q1 = r1(K2) = K1 and (MRJ1 − MCJ1 ) − (MRI1 − MCI1 ) = 0 − (MRI1 − MCI1 ) < 0. This
is a contradiction, therefore when β > β′, the equilibrium can not be E5. Similar analysis
holds for E3.
(iv) E4: MRI1 − MCI1 = (a − c1) − 2(b − c2)K1, and MRI2 − MCI2 ≤ 0. Under joint
procurement the equilibrium is either E1, E3, E4 or E5. If the equilibrium is E4 under joint
procurement, buyer 1 and buyer 2 are indifferent. For any of the equilibria E1, E3 or E5
(for β ∈ (β43, 1]), buyer 1 is worse off since MRJ1 − MCJ1 < MRI1 − MCI1 and qJ1 ≤ qI1 ,
whereas buyer 2 is better off since qJ2 ≥ 0 and MRJ2 −MC2 ≥ 0.
We conclude that when buyer 2 has tight capacity, buyer 1 is better off if only if b > 2c2
or β > β′, whereas buyer 2 is always better off.
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(2) When buyer 2 has medium capacity under independent procurement, initially the
equilibrium is E2, qIi = q
I




i , i = 1, 2. The system can be in one of the five
equilibria (E1, E2, E3, E4, E5) under joint procurement (see Figure 8). For each possible
equilibrium under joint procurement we check if and when the buyers are better off:
(i) If under joint procurement equilibrium is E2 (i.e., if K2 ≥ a−c13(b−c2) or if K2 <
a−c1
3(b−c2)
and β ≤ β2), then both buyers are better off, since MRJi = MCJi and qJi > qIi , i = 1, 2.
(ii) If under joint procurement equilibrium is E5 or E1 (i.e, if a−c14(b−c2) ≤ K2 <
a−c1
3(b−c2)
and β > β2 or if K2 < a−c14(b−c2) and β >min{β31, β
c}), then MRJi − MCJi ≥ MRIi − MCIi
and qJi > q
I
i , i = 1, 2. The buyers are better off under joint procurement.
(iii) If under joint procurement equilibrium is E3, i.e, if,
K2 <
a−c1
4(b−c2) , β2 < β <min{β31, β
c},






1 and buyer 1 is better off under joint procurement. Since
MRJ2 = MC
J
2 , buyer 2 is better off under joint procurement if and only if q
J
2 = r2(K1) >
qI2 = q
I
U . The β value at which r2(K1) = q
I
U is β
′′ = bc2 −
a−c1−2(b−c2)qIU
c2K1
. For β > β′′ buyer
2 is better off, whereas for β < β′ buyer 2 is worse off. Note that β′′ < β31, since at β31,
r2(K1) = K2 > qIU .
(iv) If under joint procurement equilibrium is E4, then MRJ1−MCJ1 > MRI1−MCI1 = 0,
and qJ1 > q
I
1 , buyer 1 is better off under joint procurement. MR
J
2 −MCJ2 < MRI2 −MCI2
and qJ2 < q
I
2 , buyer 2 is worse off under joint procurement.
We conclude that when buyer 2 has medium capacity under independent procurement,
buyer 1 is always better off under joint procurement. Buyer 2 is better off if only if K2 ≥
a−c1
4(b−c2) or β ≤ β2 or β >min{β
c, β′′}. holds.
A.6 Proposition 3
We show that under Cases 11-19, setting β∗C <min{β2, βc} and selling (K1, r2(K1)+) is
never the optimal decision of the supplier. Whenever β∗C ≤ β2, optimal decision is to sell





, to each buyer. When there exist multiple equilibria, we only
compare (K1, r2(K1)+) versus (qU , qU ), since the analysis is symmetrical for (r1(K2)+,K2).
We analyze the following cases:
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a) β43 ≤ β2
b) β2 < β43
For the proof of Proposition 3, we use the following lemma.
Lemma 6 For β <min{β2, βc}, πJS(qU , qU , β) > πJS(K1, r2(K1), β).
Proof (Lemma 6). It is sufficient to show that, for 0 ≤ β ≤ βc, and K1 > qU ,
πJS(qU , qU , β) > π
J
S(K1, r2(K1), β).
For this, we show for 0 < β < βc, πJS(K1, r2(K1), β) is a concave function of K1, and
is maximized at K∗1 , where K
∗
1 < qU =
a−c1
3b−(2+β)c2 . Note, K1 > qU for β ∈ [0, β2], since
K1 > K2. Therefore for 0 ≤ β ≤ β2, πJS(qU , qU , β) > πJS(K1, r2(K1), β).
πJS(K1, r2(K1), β) =
(




c1 − c2(βK1 + r2(K1))
)
r2(K1)
















− 2c2K1 + 2c2







































































4(b− c2)2 + (b− βc2)2 − 4β(b− βc2)(b− c2)
2(b− c2)2
= −c2 ·





2 < 0, i.e., πS(K1, r2(K1), β2) is concave in K1. Let K∗1 be the value at which
πS(K1, r2(K1), β) is maximized.
We show that K∗1 < qU , for 0 < β < β
c.
K∗1 =
c1(b− (2− β)c2)(b− c2) + c2(a− c1)(b + βc2 − 2βb)
c2
(
(b− (2− β)c2)2 + 4(1− β)(b− βc2)(b− c2)
) ≤? a− c1
3b− (2 + β)c2
ac2(b + βc2 − 2βb) + c1(b− (2− β)c2)(b− c2)− c1c2(b + βc2 − 2βb)
c2
(
(b− (2− β)c2)2 + 4(1− β)(b− βc2)(b− c2)
) ≤? a− c1
3b− (2 + β)c2
ac2(b + βc2 − 2βb) + c1(b2 − (4− 3β)bc2 + 2(1− β)c22)
c2
(
(b− (2− β)c2)2 + 4(1− β)(b− βc2)(b− c2)
) ≤? a− c1
3b− (2 + β)c2
(49)
To simplify the analysis, we assume c2 = 1 without loss of generality. This implies
1 < b < 2− β. Let us arrange the terms in the inequality so that,
a
( (b + β − 2βb)
(b− (2− β))2 + 4(1− β)(b− β)(b− 1)
− 1




( (b2 − (4− 3β)b + 2(1− β))
(b− (2− β))2 + 4(1− β)(b− β)(b− 1)
+
1
3b− (2 + β)
)
The LHS of the inequality is linear in a. Therefore if we check for the lower and upper
bounds on a and observe that the inequality holds, then it holds for any a.









Comparing the first terms of LHS and RHS of the inequality:
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b + β − 2βb < −b2 + (4− 3β)b− 2(1− β)
0 < 3b− βb + β − b2 − 2
0 < −b2 + (3− β)b− (2− β)
0 < −(b− (2− β))(b− 1)
Since 1 < b < 2− β, the inequality holds and this implies (50) holds.
From assumption A3, an upper bound on a is c1b. Plugging 1 in place of c2 and c1b in
place of a in (49):
b(b + β − 2βb) + b2 − (4− 3β)b + 2(1− β)
(b− (2− β))2 + 4(1− β)(b− β)(b− 1)
≤ b− 1
3b− (2 + β)
2(1− β)(b− 1)2
(b− (2− β))2 + 4(1− β)(b− β)(b− 1)
≤ b− 1
3b− (2 + β)
2(1− β)(b− 1)(3b− (2 + β)) ≤ (b− (2− β))2 + 4(1− β)(b− β)(b− 1)
2(1− β)(b− 1)(b + β − 2) ≤ (b + β − 2)2
Since b < 2 − β, LHS is always negative and RHS is always positive, the inequality is
satisfied.
Therefore K∗1 is always less than qU and πS(qU , qU , β) > πS(K1, r2(K1), β), for 0 < β <
β2 and K1 > qU .
Now we present the proof of Proposition 3.
Proof (Proposition 3).
a) β43 < β2: (Note β43 ≤ βc) For β < β43, one of the equilibria is (K1, 0) and at β43,
(K1, 0) = (K1, r2(K1). Since β3 > β43 (see Lemma 7), from Lemma 6, we conclude that for
β∗C <min{β2, βc}, πS(q∗C , q∗C , β∗C) > πS(K1, r2(K1)+, β∗C) (note, β43 ≤ βc).
This analysis corresponds to cases 11-16.
b) β43 > β2: Under this case βc > β2 and for β < β2 one of the equilibria is (K1, 0).
For β < β2, πS(K1, 0) could be greater than π(qU , qU , β). However, since β3 > β43 (Lemma
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7), when equilibrium is E3, the profit of the supplier increases. Therefore, again, setting
β∗C <min{β2, βc} and selling (K1, r2(K1)+) is not the optimal decision.
This analysis corresponds to cases 17-19.
A.7 Theorem 3
Before starting the proof, let us first determine the β values that maximize the supplier’s
profit under each equilibrium:
E1: This is the case, for example, if the system is in Case 1, or if the system is in Case
2 and β ∈ [β51, 1]. Since under E1 the buyers’ procurement quantities do not change with
β, the profit function is linearly decreasing in β, and maximized at the minimum β value
that is feasible for that case. For example, β = 0 and β = β51 maximize the supplier’s profit
under in Case 1 and Case 2, respectively.
E2: This is the case if the system is in Case 11, or if the system is in Cases 12-19 and
β ∈ [0, β2]. The supplier’s profit function under E2 is πs(qU , qU , β), is maximized at β∗U (in
Equation (24)). Under E2, maximum profit is attained at min{β∗U , β2, 1}.
E3: This is the case, for example, if the system is in Case 9 and β ∈ [β43, βc]. The
supplier’s profit function under E3, πs(K1, r2(K1), β), is concave in β, and from first order




For example in Case 9, maximum profit is attained at min{max{β43, β3}, βc}.
E4: Buyer 1 procures at capacity whereas buyer 2 does not procure. The supplier’s
profit function is constant for all β values.
E5: This is the case, for example, if the system is in Case 15 and β ∈ [βc, β51]. The
supplier’s profit function under E5, πs(r1(K2),K2, β), is concave in β and from first order




For example in Case 15, maximum profit is attained a min{max{βc, β5}, β51}.
(We do not consider E6, since in Proposition 3, we show that (K2, 0) can never be the
optimal quantity tuple that the supplier sells).
97
We determine β∗C for all of the Cases 1-19. First, we introduce the following lemma.
Lemma 7 (1) In Cases 11-13, if β∗U < β2, then β5 < β2.
(2) In Cases 14-19, if β∗U > β2, then β3 > β2.
(3) a. In Cases 14-16, there exists a discontinuity and the profit function decreases as
the equilibrium switches from E2 to E3.
b. In Cases 17-19, there exists a discontinuity and the profit function decreases as
the equilibrium switches from E2 to E4, except when β2 < β∗U and β2 < β43.
(4) If β43 > 0, then β43 < β3.
(5) In Cases 6, 7, 9, 10, 15, 16, 18, 19, there exists a discontinuity and the profit
function increases as the equilibrium switches from E3 to E5.
(6) If β3 < βc, then β5 < β3.
Proof (Lemma 7).
(1) Note in Cases 11-13, K2 ≥ a−c14(b−c2) . The condition that leads to β
∗
U < β2 is:
3b(2c1 − a)− 2c1c2
ac2
<
(3b− 2c2)K2 − (a− c1)
c2K2
3b(2c1 − a)− 2c1c2 < (3b− 2c2)a−
a(a− c1)
K2
6bc1 − 3ab− 2c1c2 − 3ab + 2ac2 < −
a(a− c1)
K2









The condition that leads to β5 < β2 is:
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c1(b− c2) + (c2 − 2b)(a− c1 − bK2)
c2K2(4b− 3c2)
<
(3b− 2c2)K2 − (a− c1)
c2K2
c1(b− c2) + (a− c1)(c2 − 2b)− bK2(c2 − 2b) < (3b− 2c2)(4b− 3c2)K2 − (a− c1)(4b− 3c2)
c1(b− c2) + (a− c1)(c2 − 2b + 4b− 3c2) < (10b2 − 16bc2 + 6c22)K2
(2a− 2c1 + c1)(b− c2) < 2(b− c2)(5b− 3c2)K2




We simply check whether K2 > a2(3b−c2) and K2 ≥
a−c1
4(b−c2) implies K2 >
2a−c1
2(5b−3c2) , or















a(5b− 3c2)− (2a− c1)(3b− c2)
)(
(a− c1)(5b− 3c2)− (2a− c1)(2b− 2c2)
)
<? 0(
(c1 − a)(3b− c2) + a(2b− 2c2)
)(





(a− c1)(3b− c2)− a(2b− 2c2)
)2
<? 0
LHS is always negative, therefore in Cases 11-13, if β∗u < β2, β5 < β2.
(2) Let us consider β2 as a function of K2 and β3 as a function of K1. First we introduce
the following observation on β3 and β2.
Observation 17 a. β2 is increasing in K2.
b. β3 may be decreasing or increasing in K1 depending on the parameters.
Then depending on β3, there exist two cases: Case(1) The coefficient of 1K1 is positive
in β3, Case(2) The coefficient of 1K1 is negative in β3.
Case(1). β3 is decreasing in K1. We introduce the following lemma.









c1(b− c2) + (c2 − 2b)(a− c1 − bK1) >? (2c2 − b)(4b− 3c2)K1
c1(b− c2) + (c2 − 2b)(a− c1) >?
(
(2c2 − b)(4b− 3c2) + b(c2 − 2b)]K1
2c1c2 + 2ab− 3bc1 − ac2 <? 6(b− c2)2K1
Plugging qM in place of K1:
2c1c2 + 2ab− 3bc1 − ac2 <? 3(ab− c1b− ac2 + c1c2)






The inequality holds since c22c2−b >
b
c2




Under Case(1), β3 is decreasing in K1 and since K1 ≤ qM we conclude that β3 > βc for
any given K1. We consider Cases 14-19 where β2 < βc. Therefore β3 > β2.
Case(2). Under this case β3 is increasing, i.e., the coefficient of K1 is negative. We
would like to check whether β3 > β2 in this case. For this it is necessary to check whether
there exists K1 and K2 that satisfy:
min β3 − β2 < 0
st. qIU < K2 < upper bound
K2 < K1
If, for all possible K1 and K2, β3 − β2 > 0 is positive, then we conclude that β3 > β2.























(2b− c2)(a− c1)− c1(b− c2)
c2(4b− 3c2)









, and since from Assumption A3 ac1 <
b
c2
, we conclude that the
inequality holds.
This implies, setting K2 to its maximum quantity and setting K1 to K2 gives the mini-
mum value of β3 − β2.
β3 >
? β2
Plugging K2 in place of K1:
c1(b− c2) + (c2 − 2b)(a− c1 − bK2)
4b− 3c2)
> (3b− 2c2)K2 − (a− c1)
(c1 + 2a− 2c1)(b− c2) > 2(5b2 − 8bc2 + 3c22)K2




We check whether this inequality holds for the upper bound of K2. There exist two
upper bounds on K2: (i) the value at which β∗U = β2, K2 =
a
(3b−c2) (note, for higher values
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of K2, β∗U < β2), (ii) K2 ≤
a−c1
4(b−c2) (since we consider the Cases 14-19). Depending on which





































We conclude β3 > β2.
(3.a) In Cases 14-16, at β2, the equilibrium switches from E2 to E3. In Lemma 6, we
showed πS(qU , qU , β) > πS(K1, r1(K2), β) for 0 ≤ β < βc. Since in Cases 14-16 β2 < βc, at
β2 there exists a downward jump in the profit function.
(3.b) In Cases 17-19, at β2, the equilibrium switches from E2 to E4. Note, πS(K1, 0) =
πS(K1, r1(K2), β43) < πS(qU , qU , β43), since β43 < βc. If β∗U < β2, then πS(qU , qU , β2) >
πS(qU , qU , β43) > πS(K1, 0). However, if β2 < β∗U , whether πS(qU , qU , β2) depends on
system parameters. Therefore if β2 < β∗U there may be a downward or an upward jump in
the profit function when switching from E2.
(4) We check whether β43 < β3, given β43 > 0.
bK1 − (a− c1)
c2K1
<?
c1(b− c2) + (c2 − 2b)(a− c1 − bK1)
c2K1(4b− 3c2)
bK1 − (a− c1) <?
c1(b− c2) + (c2 − 2b)(a− c1 − bK1)
4b− 3c2
−2(a− c1 − bK1)(b− c2) <? c1(b− c2)
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β43 > 0 implies K1 > a−c1b and assumption A1 states b > c2. Therefore the inequality
holds.
(5) For the proof, we compare πS(K1, r2(K1), βc) and πS(r1(K2),K2, βc). Note, in Cases
6, 7, 9, 10, 15, 16, 18, 19, K2 ≥ qM −K1.
πS(K1, r2(K1), βc) ≤? πS(r1(K2),K2, βc)(





c1 − c2[qM −K1 + βcK1]
)
(qM −K1) ≤?(





c1 − c2[qM −K2 + βcK2])
)
(qM −K2)
c1qM − c2q2M − 2c2K21 (1− βc)
+2c2K1qM (1− βc) ≤? c1qM − c2q2M − 2c2K22 (1− βc)
+ 2c2K2qM (1− βc)
2(1− βc)c2(K1 −K2)qM ≤? 2(1− βc)c2(K21 −K22 )
qM ≤ K1 + K2
This holds as strict inequality for K2 ≥ qM −K1, in which case there exists an upward
jump in the profit function when switching from E3 to E5. It holds as equality for K2 =
qM −K1 and in that case, the function is continuous when switching from E3 to E5.
(6) Let us first identify the condition(s) for β3 = β5.
c1(b− c2) + (c2 − 2b)(a− c1 − bK1)
c2K1(4b− 3c2)
=
c1(b− c2) + (c2 − 2b)(a− c1 − bK2)
c2K2(4b− 3c2)
c1(b− c2)K2 + (c2 − 2b)(a− c1 − bK1)K2 = c1(b− c2)K1 + (c2 − 2b)(a− c1 − bK2)K1
c1(b− c2)K2 + (c2 − 2b)(a− c1)K2 = c1(b− c2)K1 + (c2 − 2b)(a− c1)K1(
c1(b− c2) + (c2 − 2b)(a− c1)
)
(K2 −K1) = 0
For the inequality to hold,
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Note, as a decreases both β5 and β3 increases, and since K2 < K1, the amount of
increase in β5 is greater than the amount of increase in β3.
We find β3 at a = c1 3b−2c22b−c2 :
β3 =








c1(b− c2) + (c2 − 2b)
(







(2 bc2 − 1)
(4 bc2 − 3)
· b
c2
We will show that, β3 (or β5) value is always greater than βc when a = c1 3b−2c2c2−2b :
(2 bc2 − 1)









)2 − ( b
c2
























This inequality always holds, i.e., at a = c1 3b−2c22b−c2 , β
c < β3 = β5. For lower values of a,
βc < β3 < β5, and for higher values of a, β5 < β3. Therefore we conclude that if β3 < β5,
βc < β3, or equivalently if β3 < βc, β5 < β3.
Now we introduce the proof of Theorem 3.
Proof (Theorem 3). (In accordance with Figure 10)
Cases 1 and 4: The system is in E1. β∗C = 0.
Cases 2 and 3: The system passes through E5, and E1 (Case 2). β∗C =min{β5, β51, 1}+.
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Cases 5 and 8: The system passes through E4 (Case 8), E3 and E1. From Lemma 7.4,
β43 < β3 under Case 8. Therefore supplier’s profit function is increasing until min{β3, β31}+.
β∗C =min{β3, β31}+.
Cases 6, 7, 9 and 10: The system passes through E4 (Cases 9 and 10), E3, E5, and E1
(Cases 6 and 9). The function is constant under E4. There exist three subcases:
(i) β3 < βc: Under E3, the supplier’s profit function is maximized at β3. Lemma
7.5 states there exists an upward jump switching from E3 to E5, and Lemma 7.6
implies under E5 the function is decreasing. The function continues to decrease
under E1. β∗C =argmax{πS(β3), πS(βc)}.
(ii) βc < β3 and β5 < βc: Under E3, the profit function is increasing and under E5
the function is decreasing. From Lemma 7.5, there exists an upward jump switching
from E3 to E5. β∗C = β
c.
(iii) βc < β3 and βc < β5: Under E3, the profit function is increasing and under E5
the function is increasing until min{β5, β51}. β∗C =min{β5, β51, 1}.
Cases 11, 12 and 13: The system passes through E2, E5 (Cases 12 and 13) and E1 (Case
12). There exist three subcases:
(i) β∗U < β2: Under E2, the supplier’s profit function is maximized at β
∗
U . Lemma
7.1 implies, under E5 the function is decreasing. Note there does not exist a discon-
tinuity in the profit function as the system switches from E2 to E5, since at β2, the
equilibrium quantities change from (qU , qU ) = (K2,K2) to (r1(K2),K2) = (K2,K2).
The function keeps decreasing under E1. β∗C = β
∗
U .
(ii) β∗U > β2 and β2 < β5 (Cases 12 and 13): Under E2, the profit function is in-
creasing. Since β2 < β5, under E5 the function keeps increasing until min{β5, β51}.
The function is decreasing under E1. β∗C =min{β5, β51, 1}.
(iii) β∗U > β2 and β5 < β2 (Cases 12 and 13): Under E2, the profit function is
increasing. Since β5 < β2, under E5 the function is decreasing. The function keeps
decreasing under E1. β∗C = β2.
Cases 14 and 17: The system passes through E2, E4 (Case 17), E3, and E1. There exist
two subcases:
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(i) β3 < β2 (Case 14): From Lemma 7.2, under E2 the system is maximized at β∗U .
As the equilibrium switches from E2 to E3, there is a downward jump (by Lemma
7.3.a). The function decreases under E3 and keeps decreasing under E1. β∗C = β
∗
U .
(ii) β2 < β3: Under E2, the system is maximized at min{β∗U , β2}. There exists a
jump when switching from E2 to E4 or E3. Under E3 the function keeps increasing
until min{β3, β31}. The function decreases under E1.
β∗C =argmax{πS(min{β2, β∗U}), πS(min{β3, β31})}
Cases 15, 16, 18 and 19: The system passes through E2, E4 (Cases 18 and 19), E3, E5
and E1 (Cases 15 and 18). There exist four subcases:
(i) β3 < β2 (Cases 15 and 16): From Lemma 7.2, under E2 the system is maxi-
mized at β∗U . When switching from E2 there exists a downward jump (by Lemma
7.3.a) and the function decreases under E3. At βc there exists an upward jump
(Lemma 7.5). Since β5 < βc by Lemma 7.6, the function decreases in E5 and keeps
decreasing in E1. β∗C =argmax{πS(β∗U ), πS(βc)}.
(ii) β2 < β3 < βc: Under E2, the system is maximized at min{β∗U , β2}. At β2 there
exists a discontinuity, and the profit function is constant under E4. Under E3, the
function increases until β3. At βc there exists an upward jump (Lemma 7.5). Since
β5 < β
c by Lemma 7.6, the function decreases in E5 and keeps decreasing in E1.
β∗C =argmax{πS(min{β2, β∗U}), πS(β3), πS(βc)}.
(iii) βc < β3 and β5 < βc: Under E2, the system is maximized at min{β∗U , β2}. At β2
there exists a discontinuity and the profit function is constant under E4. Since βc <
β3, the function increases under E3. At βc there exists an upward jump and the
profit function decreases under E5 and E1. β∗C =argmax{πS(min{β∗U , β2}), πS(βc)}.
(iv) βc < β3 and βc < β5: Similar to (ii), however when the system is in E5, the func-
tion is maximized at min{β5, β51}. β∗C =argmax{πS(min{β∗U , β2}), πS(min{β5, β51, 1}}.
A.8 Proposition 4
(1) For Cases 1 and 4, supplier sets β = β∗C = 0. For cases 2, 3, and 11-13, Proposition 2
indicates buyers are willing to collaborate for any β
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(2) In Case 5, buyer 1 collaborates when both buyers procure at capacity (which is
realized at β31) and β > β′ (where β′ > β31). Note, an upper bound on β∗C is β31. In
this case, if β′ > 1, or equivalently if 1 − r2(K1)K2 >
c2
b , collaboration does not take place.
If 1 − r2(K1)K2 <
c2
b , then the supplier compares the profit under no collaboration with the
profit under πS(K1,K2, β′):
πS(K1,K2, β′) >? πS(K1, r1(K2), 0)
c1 >
? c2(K2 + r2(K1)) + b(2K1)
is the condition that the supplier agrees to compromise and set β = β′.
(3) In Cases 6-10, Proposition 2 indicates buyer 1 does not collaborates.
(4) In Cases 14-19, buyer 1 collaborates, whereas buyer 2 may not collaborate.
(a) If β∗C 6= β3, then either β∗C < β2, β∗C = β31 > β′′ or β∗C > βc. Proposition 2 indicates
buyer 2 is willing to collaborate for those β values. If β∗C = β3 > β
′′, then again ,buyer 2 is
willing to collaborate.
(b) If β∗C = β3 < β
′′, then buyer 2 does not collaborates. Supplier sets β as:
(i) For Cases 14 and 17: β =argmax{πS(min{β2, β∗U}), πS(β′′)}
(ii) For Cases 15,16, 18 and 19:
β =argmax{πS(min{β2, β∗U}), πS(β′′), πS(βc)}.
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APPENDIX B
ADDENDUM FOR CHAPTER 4
B.1 Proposition 5
First we introduce the following lemma.
Lemma 10 1) Lateness cost, Li(d), is convex increasing in i, for i ≥ 0, for any given
d ∈ [0, dmax].
2) Inventory cost, Ii, is convex decreasing in i, for i ≥ 0, and bounded by 0 below.
Proof (Lemma 10).








(i + 1− k)d
k
k!
Li(d) is increasing in i.











































k! is increasing in i, and therefore Li(d) is convex.
2) Ii is decreasing in i:
(a) For i ≤ −1,















0 (t − x)Es+i+1λe
−λtdxdt < 1λ , and Ii+1 − Ii < 0 for
i ≤ −1. Furthermore the second term decreases in i, therefore Ii+1 − Ii decreases in i and
Ii is concave decreasing for i ≤ −1.
(b) For i ≥ 0,



































− · · · − (1)µ
iλ
(λ + µ)i+2
This term is always negative, therefore Ii is decreasing for i ≥ 0. Furthermore for i ≥ 0
Ii+1 − Ii is increasing in i. Therefore Ii is convex decreasing for i ≥ 0.
Proof (Proposition 5). We assume that at optimality the average return is positive.
The proof has two steps:
(1) Show that ∃ a state N for which ri(dmax) > ri(d) for d ∈ [0, dmax), i ≥ N .
(2) Show that N is an upper bound on the state where the customer is rejected at
optimality.
(1) We show ∃ a state N such that ∂ri(d)∂d > 0, for d ∈ [0, dmax], i ≥ N .
ri(d) = f(d)(R− Li(d)− Ii+1) + (1− f(d))(−Ii)
∂ri(d)
∂d = f
′(d)(R− Li(d)− Ii+1) + (−∂Li(d)∂d )f(d)− f
′(d)(−Ii)
= f ′(d)(R− Li(d) + Ii − Ii+1)− f(d)∂Li(d)∂d
= f ′(d)(R− Li(d) + Ii − Ii+1) + f(d)
∫∞
d Ei+1dx
f ′(d) < 0 and from Lemma 10, (R − Li(d) + Ii − Ii+1) < 0 for sufficiently large i.
Therefore ∂ri(d)∂d > 0 for d ∈ [0, dmax) and for sufficiently large i.
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where πi(d) is the steady-state probability of being in state i and di is the due date
quoted at state i, under due date policy d.
We show that for any state k ≥ N , rejecting a customer at k yields a higher average
return than quoting a due date d ∈ [0, dmax) at k and rejecting at k + 1. Let us assume
k = N wlog. Let policy 1 correspond to rejecting in state N and policy 2 correspond to
rejecting in N + 1, all other states being quoted di under both policies. Let π1i and π
2
i be
the steady-state probabilities of state i, and gd1 and g
d
2 be the average returns for policy 1
and policy 2, respectively.
Let a−s = 1, and
ai =ai−1f(di−1)λ










, for −s ≤ i ≤ N + 1.
where dN ∈ [0, dmax) and dN+1 = dmax. We check
gd1 >
? gd2∑N−1




















> 1. We showed in step (1) that rN (dmax) > rN (d). Since rN+1(dmax) =
−Ii+1 < 0,∑N−1
−s airi(di) + aNrN (dmax) >
∑N−1
−s airi(di) + aNrN (dmax) + aN+1rN+1(dmax).
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There exist two possibilities:
1)
∑N−1




2 and at optimality there exists
finite number of states.
2)
∑N−1
−s airi(di) + aNrN (dmax) < 0. In this case since ri(d) < 0 for i ≥ N and
d ∈ [0, dmax], the system can not both have infinite number of states and a positive average
return. Therefore N should be an upper bound on the state where customers are rejected.
B.2 Lemma 1
























k! are decreasing in d.
B.3 Lemma 3
Proof. We use backward induction with the following steps:
Step 1. Show that E∗m(i, i − 1) = E∗m(i + 1, i) for i ≥ N (N is the upper limit on the
state where optimal decision is to quote d = dmax).
Step 2. Assume E∗m(i, i− 1) ≥ E∗m(i + 1, i) for i = k, k + 1, · · · , N − 1.
Step 3. Show E∗m(i, i− 1) ≥ E∗m(i + 1, i) holds for i = 0, 1, · · · , k − 1.
Let d∗i be the due date that maximizes E
∗
m(i, i− 1), i.e.,
E∗m(i, i− 1) =
−λg∗ + λ(d∗i )(R− Li(d∗i )) + λ(d∗i )E∗m(i + 1, i)
µ
Step 1. For i ≥ N , since d∗i = dmax, λ(d∗i ) = 0, which implies E∗m(N,N − 1) =
E∗m(N + 1, N) = · · · =
−g∗
µ .
Step 2. Assume E∗m(i, i− 1) ≥ E∗m(i + 1, i) for i = k, k + 1, · · · , N − 1.
Step 3. Note, for i = k − 1,
E∗m(k − 1, k − 2) = maxd{
−λg∗ + λ(d)(R− Lk−1(d)) + λ(d)E∗m(k, k − 1)
µ
} ≥













for all i, and E∗m(k, k−1) ≥ E∗m(k+1, k) by the assumption
in Step 2.
The structure of E∗m(i, i − 1) is the same for all i ≥ 0 (from (34)), therefore induction


































for i = 1, 2, · · · , j = 1, 2.
Note,




2 + · · ·+ ρ11ρ12 · · · ρ1n + · · · > 1 + ρ21 + ρ21ρ22 + · · ·+ ρ21ρ22 · · · ρ2n + · · · (53)
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Consider a system with inventory level s. If all states are quoted 0, then total revenue per
unit time and total lateness cost per unit time (TLC) reach their highest values. Given
a base-stock level s, as R increases, optimal policy will be quoting 0 (i.e, accepting an
order) in an increasing number of states, and as R goes to infinity, optimal policy will be
an accept-all policy. The reason is, under accept-all policy total lateness cost per unit time





















whereas there is no upper bound on the revenue.
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As R increases, g∗(s,R), the optimal return per unit time (a function of s and R),
approaches to the return per unit time of the accept-all policy, g0(s,R), while g0(s,R),
which is a linear increasing function of R, is always a lower bound on g∗(s,R). Note
g∗(s,R) is continuous in R.
Assuming s1 > 0, let us consider s−1 and s ≤ s1. We know that g0(s,R) > g0(s−1, R)
(since 0 < s ≤ s1). Also note that g∗(s − 1, 0) > g∗(s, 0). Since g∗(s − 1, R) approaches
to g0(s − 1, R) and g∗(s,R) approaches to g0(s,R), there should be an R value at which
g∗(s− 1, R) and g∗(s,R) intersect. Call this value, where the retailer is indifferent between
keeping inventory of s− 1 and s, R∗s. If R > R∗s, the retailer prefers keeping at least s units
of inventory (see Figure 18).
Figure 18: The optimal profit per unit time with respect to R (h = 0.3, l = 1.5, λ = 0.45)
The following lemma states, at R∗s the due date quoted under the optimal policies for
the two inventory levels s− 1 and s, is the same in non-negative states, in other words the
two policies are ‘equivalent’.
Lemma 11 Let ds−1 and ds be the optimal due date policies at R∗s when inventory levels are
s−1 and s respectively. Then ds−1 and ds are ‘equivalent’, i.e., ds−1i = d
s
i for i = 0, 1, · · · .
Proof. First, we derive an expression for Rds , where g
d(s− 1, Rds ) = gd(s,Rds ), given a
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policy d. For simplicity, d implies the due dates for states 0, 1, · · · , and for negative states
the due date quoted is 0. Let us define πi(d) as the steady-state probability of being in
state i when base-stock level is s− 1, and πi′(d) as the steady-state probability of being in
state i when base-stock level is s.












































(−i) = (λRds − s · h)π−s′(d)
(54)
Note πi = ( 11−π−s′ )πi
′. By plugging in 11−π−s′πi























)πi′(−i) = (λRds − s · h)π−s′
Dividing both sides by π−s1−π−s and then adding (λR
d













′(d)(−i) = λRds − s · h
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gd(s,Rds ) = λR
d
s − s · h (55)












= (λRds − s · h)π−s′(d)
Dividing both sides by π−s′(d),
Rds =




































λR∗s − s · h > λRd
s−1

















This implies R∗s > R
ds−1
s .
On the other hand, gd
s
(s,R∗s) = g
ds−1(s − 1, R∗s) > gd
s−1
(s,R∗s). g
ds−1(s − 1, R∗s) >
gd
s−1
(s,R∗s) implies, at R
∗
s base-stock level s− 1 yields higher profit than base-stock level s
under policy ds−1. Therefore the revenue at which the profit functions intersect under policy
ds−1, Rd
s−1
s , is greater than R
∗
s. This is a contradiction. Therefore d
s−1 is ‘equivalent’ to




s , i.e., g
ds−1(s− 1, R∗s) = gd
s−1
(s,R∗s).
R∗s is the fixed point of the function in (56), say k(R):
k(R) =











where d is the optimal policy under base-stock s − 1 and revenue R. (Although there
does not exist any R term in (58), since d is a function of R, so is k.)
Note k(R) is a unimodal function and attains its maximum point at R∗s as in Figure 19.
Figure 19: k(R)
Using unimodality of k(R) function we can find R∗s (with ε closeness) as below:
1) Find the optimal policy for R = 0 under base-stock s− 1.
2) Iteratively set R = k(R), find the optimal due date policy and plug in (58), until the
difference between two consecutive R values are ε.
The threshold R value R∗, that indicates whether operating under the MTO system or
a hybrid system is more beneficial, is simply R∗1.
B.6 Proposition 11
We show that the optimal base-stock level obtained under accept-reject policy with action
set {0, 4} is an upper bound on the optimal base-stock level obtained under the incremental
policy with action set {0, 0.5, · · · , 4}.
Let us indicate the optimal profit per unit time under accept-reject policy with gar(s).
Then for any R it holds that, g∗(s,R) > gar(s,R) > g0(s,R), and as R increases, g∗(s,R)
117
and gar(s,R) approach to g0(s,R). Let the revenue at which gar(s − 1, R) and gar(s,R)
intersect be Rars .
Figure 20: Rars and R
∗
s
To show that optimal base-stock under the accept-reject policy is an upper bound on
the incremental policy, we show Rars < R
∗
s, which is equivalent to the following:
g∗(s− 1, Rars ) > g∗(s,Rars )
(see Figure 20).
First we show gd(s − 1, Rars ) > gd(s,Rars )(= g∗(s,Rars )), where d is the optimal in-
cremental due date policy under base-stock level s and revenue Rars . For simplicity let
us indicate the steady probability in state i under base-stock s − 1 with πi, and under
base-stock s with πi′. Again, the relation πi = ( 11−π−s′ )πi
′ holds between πi and πi′.













































(−i) >? (λRars − s · h)π−s′
Plugging ( 11−π−s′ )πi


















′(−i) >? (λRars − s · h)π−s′
Dividing both sides by π−s
′
1−π−s′ , and then adding (λR
ar










′(−i) >? λRars − s · h
Note the left-hand-side of the inequality is equal to gd(s,Rars ). From equation (55),
right-hand-side is equal to gar(s,Rars ). We obtain,
gd(s,Rars ) >
? gar(s,Rars )
This inequality holds since for a given R, optimal profit of the accept-reject policy is a
lower bound on the optimal return of the incremental policy. Therefore,
g∗(s− 1, Rars ) ≥ gd(s− 1, Rars ) > gar(s,Rars )
which implies Rars < R
∗
s and optimal base-stock under the accept-reject policy is an
upper bound on the optimal base-stock under the incremental policy.
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